Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Marketing Dissertations

Department of Marketing

Spring 4-16-2018

Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer
Behavior
Gregory Cohen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/marketing_diss

Recommended Citation
Cohen, Gregory, "Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior." Dissertation,
Georgia State University, 2018.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/11993687

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Marketing at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marketing Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior

BY

Gregory Scott Cohen

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Of

Doctor of Philosophy

In the Robinson College of Business

Of

Georgia State University

Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS
2018

1

Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation

Copyright by
Gregory Scott Cohen
2018

Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior

ACCEPTANCE

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the Gregory Scott Cohen’s Dissertation Committee. It has
been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has been accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration in the J. Mack Robinson
College of Business of Georgia State University.

Richard Phillips, Dean

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
Dr. Jeffrey R. Parker
Dr. Naveen Donthu
Dr. Ryan Hamilton
Dr. Denish Shah

3

Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation

ABSTRACT

Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior

BY

Gregory Scott Cohen

April 16, 2018

Committee Chair:

Jeffrey R. Parker & Naveen Donthu

Major Academic Unit:

Marketing

A central aspect of firm-consumer communications is the extent to which the consumer believes the firm. In this
dissertation, I argue that belief, more specifically a consumer’s belief in claims or material generated by the firm,
should be more adequately examined in contemporary consumer behavior literature. To this end, I review current
theories that attempt to understand belief in consumer behavior literature. Furthermore, I explore two empirical
examinations of how certain factors influence consumers’ belief in firm-generated communication and how
differing levels of belief affect consumer behavior—first in the service failure context and second in the scarcity
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CHAPTER 1:
Introduction to Believability

A central aspect of firm-consumer communications is the extent to which the consumer
believes the firm. In this dissertation, I argue that belief, more specifically a consumer’s belief in
claims or material generated by the firm, should be more adequately examined in contemporary
consumer behavior literature. To this end, I will review current theories that attempt to
understand belief in consumer behavior literature. Furthermore, I will explore two empirical
examinations of how certain factors influence consumers’ belief in firm-generated
communication and how differing levels of belief affect consumer behavior—first in the service
failure context and second in the scarcity signaling context. The goal is to better understand the
relationship between belief and consumer behavior, and, in particular, how belief can be
managed more appropriately from both a managerial and a consumer standpoint. If I can show
that belief affects consumer interactions with the firm, we will be better able to understand and
control this latent construct, which has been underexplored.
BELIEF THEORY
Belief is a broad topic—Merriam-Webster defines belief as, “a state or habit of mind in
which trust or confidence is placed in some person or thing” (Merriam-Webster 2017). This
definition highlights many key elements of belief—first, it qualifies belief as a habit. Much of
academic literature, at least literature which is psychological in nature, studies habits in one form
or another. Consumer behavior researchers are familiar with habits (Campbell and Cochrane
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1999; Ouellette and Wood 1998). Therefore, if we think of belief as simply a habit, the topic is
not as daunting as one might initially assume. Belief is just the habit of people to place trust in
something. This ideology might portray belief as in a more long-term inflexible construct—for
example, believing in a higher-power. However, this research focuses on belief in the veracity of
a message or communication. This could be long-term (i.e. I believe my wife tells me the truth)
or short term (i.e. I don’t believe she told me the truth, yesterday).
The second key element of this definition is the “thing”, or object of belief, that we are
placing trust in is subjective. For example, if a consumer buys an item via an online market place
that hosts a variety of sellers and reviews, whom are they placing their belief in? One might
argue that they believe in the market place, the sellers, the reviewers, and the capitalist system as
a whole (Gefen, Karahanna, and Straub 2003). Although habits are generalizable, people will not
generally believe an individual unless given reason to place their trust in that individual.
Belief has a bidirectional relationship with trust. Oftentimes, these two terms are thought
of as synonymous. However, belief is more transient in nature than trust. Typically, through
repeated demonstrating the belief in a person or a thing is well placed, people develop trust. Or
someone is trusted, they can most likely be believed. It is worth noting that throughout this
essay, this form of belief is paramount. Specifically, do consumers believe this
statement/claim/firm/representative?
MARKETING THEORY
Although, some people might have general tendencies to believe others, or general
tendencies to believe specific firms, it would be erroneous to assume that all consumers
inherently believe claims generated by the firm. In fact, any context in which a firm might
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benefit from dishonesty is one in which consumer disbelief may arise (Fein and Hilton 1994;
Fein 1996; Fein, Hilton, and Miller 1990; Main, Dahl, and Darke 2007). This is the fundamental
ideology behind one of the most influential works in consumer behavior—The Persuasion
Knowledge Model (PKM). PKM investigates consumers’ awareness about the strategies and
tactics that firms employ to convince them to buy a product and the motives behind such
strategies (Friestad and Wright 1994). This model begins to address consumers’ personal
knowledge related to firms’ goals and tactics and the skepticism, or disbelief, which might arise
from the use of such strategies. The PKM states that when confronted with a persuasion attempt,
consumers recall and refine their knowledge on persuasive tactics to generate the appropriate
response to the persuasive messages. Simultaneously, consumers dynamically adjust their
attitudes toward the product and the firm based on the persuasive appeal and consumers’
knowledge associated with such appeals (1994).
Surprisingly, belief is often either ignored or taken for granted in research in nonpersuasive firm-consumer communication domains such as social media (Kaplan and Haenlein
2010; Kietzmann et al. 2011), customer service (Blodgett, Wakefield, and Barnes 1995), and
service failure recovery (Folkes 1984; Tsiros, Mittal, and Ross 2004; Umashankar, Srinivasan,
and Parker 2016). However, perceptions of being deceived, regardless of reality, can create
intense negative emotional reactions (Levine, McCornack, and Avery 1992; McCornack and
Levine 1990) and can lead to resentment, disappointment, and suspicion (Bok 2011).
Furthermore, research shows that a brand’s credibility affects the formation of consideration sets
(Erdem and Swait 2004). Therefore, a firm that is prone to unbelievable communications will
undoubtedly see an impact in the willingness of consumers to trust them but also purchase from
them, effecting market share and profit margins (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001).
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There are two forms of belief in marketing research—belief as a function of source
credibility and belief as a function of information characteristics. Source credibility refers to the
expertise, trustworthiness, or objectivity of the source of information. A credible source of
information can give consumers confidence that the information is accurate. For example, a
consumer that is not familiar with a product can be easily persuaded of its quality by a credible
source (Ratneshwar and Chaiken 1991). There are a plethora of way to manipulate a source’s
credibility, from something as simple as altering their likeability by hiring a celebrity to deliver
the message to more complex utilizations of social media to make it appear that a brand is
endorsed by consumers’ personal acquaintances. In the following research, I am interested in
belief as a function of source credibility and belief as a function of information characteristics. If
the information is presented in a certain way, it can alter the likelihood that a consumer will
believe the message. For example, at the end of most drug advertisements, the potential side
effects of the drug are listed rapidly (ie. Diarrhea, Nausea, and Death). Given that these are so
quickly presented, it might indicate that the messenger is untrustworthy and has underhanded
motives (Herbst et al. 2011). Throughout the next three chapters of this dissertation, many
examples will be given of this form of belief manipulation.
RESEARCH
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I examine the extent to which consumers’
beliefs of the claims made by a point of contact (POC) evolve over repeated service failures. I
draw on literature from deception detection (Ekman and Friesen 1969; Ekman 2009) and
coincidence (Dessalles 2006; Dessalles 2008; Dimulescu and Dessalles 2009) to propose that
consumers are more likely to believe a POC when the POC gives different (vs. the same) reasons
for each of the service failures. Specifically, this dissertation aims to establish that ostensible
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coincidences (the same reason given repeatedly for service failures) provided by the POC lead
consumers to discount these explanations for the service failures. The second chapter of this
dissertation examines the idea that consumers find ostensible coincidences less believable
despite that such coincidences suggest a systemic cause for the service failure that is both more
likely and more expected by the consumer a priori. Further, when presented with an ostensible
coincidence, consumers are more likely to blame the POC for the service failure.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I conduct research that outlines the extent to
which consumers’ beliefs of scarcity signals presented by a firm differ based on the manner in
which those signals are delivered. Drawing on literature from creativity (Goldenberg, Mazursky,
and Solomon 1999a, 1999b) and persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1994; Chaiken et al. 1987;
Petty and Cacioppo 1986), I theorize that consumers are more likely to believe implicit (vs.
explicit) scarcity signals. Specifically, implicit scarcity signals require the consumer to engage in
the communication and alter the perceived source and intention of the scarcity signal. The
consumer will no longer feel the source of the scarcity signal is the firm and that the intentions
are to persuade the consumer. Further, when presented with an implicit scarcity signal,
consumers should be more likely to believe the signal is authentic and alter their purchasing
behavior to match previous scarcity literature.

Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior

CHAPTER 2:
“You're Not Going to Believe This: Ostensible Coincidences Reduce Belief in Reasons Given
for Service Failures”

A critical concern of managers is their firms’ communications with consumers, which
can range in scope from mass-media advertisements down to one-to-one communications
between consumers and the firm’s customer-service representatives. A central aspect of firmconsumer communications is the extent to which the consumer believes the firm’s claims. It is
unsurprising then that belief is one of the primary latent constructs of interest in much research
on persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1995) and advertising (Mitchell and Olson 2000). However,
belief is often either ignored or taken for granted in research on other firm-consumer
communication domains such as social media (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010; Kietzmann et al.
2011), customer service (Blodgett, Wakefield, and Barnes 1995), and service failure recovery
(Folkes 1984; Tsiros, Mittal, and Ross 2004; Umashankar, Srinivasan, and Parker 2016). Yet, it
would be erroneous to assume that consumers inherently believe claims generated by the firm, or
one of its representatives, in such non-persuasion contexts. In fact, any context in which an entity
(the firm) might benefit from dishonesty is one in which consumer disbelief may arise (Fein and
Hilton 1994; Fein 1996; Fein, Hilton, and Miller 1990; Main, Dahl, and Darke 2007). Here I
focus on firm-consumer interactions after service failures and ask: To what extent do consumers
believe the reasons firms give them for service failures?
Generally speaking, research on service failures and recoveries treats the brand as a
single, holistic entity. However, in reality, firms are comprised of numerous employees that
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differ in the amount of direct contact they have with the firm’s customers. Moreover, consumers
interact with individual employees, not abstract firms, brands, or companies. Accordingly, the
current research examines interactions between the consumer and a firm’s representative. More
specifically, this essay examine consumers’ belief of the claims made by a representative of the
firm after each of several minor but repeated service failures.
Be it for reasons of convenience (Mitchell 1979), loyalty (Jacoby and Chestnut 1978), or
habit (Hoyer 1984), consumers often repeatedly do business with the same firm (e.g., restaurant,
store, or website) from whom they purchase the same or similar items (e.g., products, services, or
both). It is not uncommon for recurring firm-consumer relationships to involve repeated
interactions between the consumer and the same firm representative (hereafter, point-of-contact
or POC) over time. For instance, consumers regularly interact the same salesperson (POC) when
making repeated purchases from a car dealership (e.g., when buying multiple cars for spouses
and children). Likewise, companies such as Dell typically establish a single customer-service or
technical-support representative (POC) for customers making purchases or seeking technical
assistance. These POCs walk the consumer through the entire process and are often designated as
the POC for future interactions, should the need arise. A more ubiquitous example is the
consumer that frequents a specific restaurant; often that consumer will be waited on by the same
server (POC) on numerous occasions. In short, it is not only common for consumers to
repeatedly interact with specific firms, but also with specific POCs within those firms.
Recurring firm-consumer relationships are typically sustained by positive experiences
with the firm, but repeated interactions also allow for the possibility of repeated, relatively minor
service failures (e.g., long wait times, incorrect orders, or rude service). While minor failures are
not ideal, they are less likely to result in the immediate termination of the firm-consumer
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relationship than more severe failures (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999) and, therefore, are
more likely to be tolerated, ceteris paribus. Thus, the context of repeated service failures is not a
contrived one, and has received some attention in previous literature (Maxham III and
Netemeyer 2002). In many, if not most, cases service failures are followed by communication
between the firm’s POC and the consumer, which is likely to involve an explanation of the
failure and, where appropriate, an apology from the firm (Folkes 1984). The question examined
here is to what extent does the consumer believe the POC’s explanation for the failure and how
does that belief evolve over repeated service failures?
Consider the following simple yet familiar scenario. A consumer has dined at a restaurant
regularly for some time. Generally, the experience has been pleasant but this consumer has had
to wait an excessive amount of time for her food on her last three visits, during each of which the
consumer was waited on by the same server. The consumer could reasonably believe these
delays were caused by either the server or the kitchen staff. Yet, only the server is in direct
contact with the consumer. Thus, the ostensible reasons—the excuses, if you will—for the
delayed meals will come from the server, not the kitchen staff. For simplicity, imagine that the
server indicates that the delay is the fault of the kitchen in all three instances. With this context in
mind, the focal question is whether ostensible causal coincidence (i.e., the same reason is given
by the same source—the server in this example—for repeated service failures) versus ostensible
causal discordance (i.e., different reasons are given by the same source for each of the service
failures) in those reasons influence the extent to which the consumer believes them (and,
equivalently, their source). In other words, are consumers more likely to believe the server if
they give the same reason for all three failures (e.g., “The kitchen forgot your order.”) or
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different reasons for each failure (e.g., “The kitchen forgot the order,” “The kitchen staff made
the order incorrectly,” and “The kitchen staff dropped the order.”)?
Objectively speaking, it could be argued that a single reason for multiple failures is more
believable as it would signal a systemic issue, which parsimoniously explains the repeated
service failures. Moreover, it seems more likely that a repeat consumer could be the recurrent
victim of a systemic issue than the victim of three distinct, if not necessarily independent, events
generating similar consequences (excessive waits in the above example). Yet, I demonstrate that
consumers are more likely to believe the server (POC) when the server (POC) gives different (vs.
the same) reasons for each of the service failures. I argue that consumers’ intuitive lay beliefs
about ostensible coincidences lead them to discount or neglect parsimonious explanations (a
systemic issue) for repeated service failures. Instead, for reasons detailed in this paper,
consumers find coincidences to be unexpected and, therefore, should find ostensible
coincidences less believable. Consequently, the consumer is less likely to believe the POC (the
server in the above example) and, in fact, more likely to blame the POC for the service failure.
THEORY
Scant research has examined how consumers cope with the uncertainty inherently
surrounding the causes of service failures. Indeed, most service failure research either (i) takes it
as a given that the cause of the failure is unambiguously known and examines factors influencing
how consumers respond to the failure and subsequent recovery efforts (Smith, Bolton, and
Wagner 1999; Maxham III and Netemeyer 2002) or (ii) examines the extent to which consumers
attribute the blame for the failure to the firm versus themselves (Folkes 1984; Pham et al. 2010;
Tsiros, Mittal, and Ross 2004). However, in reality, consumers are likely to recognize that there
may exist a disconnect between what they are told and what actually caused a service failure.
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Hence, consumers may have grounds to disbelieve reasons they are given for failures, which may
influence which individuals or entities within the firm they blame for the failure.
Notably, the reasons given for a service failure commonly originate from a single pointof-contact (POC) within the firm. The POC is typically responsible for many aspects of
successfully delivering the firm’s product or service. Concurrently, there is typically a group of
individuals responsible for the production or creation of the firm’s services or products that do
not interact with the customer directly. Thus, when a service failure occurs, it may be the fault of
the POC or of another employee or group within the firm.
The current work examines the context of repeated minor service failures, each of which
is followed by the firm’s POC providing an ostensible cause for the failure. I am particularly
interested in situations in which the repeated service failures could plausibly have been caused
by the actions of the POC, but the POC attributes the causes of those failures to employees or
groups other than themselves. Such instances are interesting because the POC has obvious
motives for deflecting blame if he or she personally caused the service failures (e.g., avoiding
customer complaints or anger directed at them), but could also be telling the truth when
indicating that others in the firm caused the failures. Hence, in these circumstances, the
consumer may either choose to believe the POC or, instead, infer that the POC is deflecting
blame. The question then is when and why would the consumer be more or less likely to believe
the ostensible causes provided by the POC? Part of the answer to that question lies in research on
individuals’ abilities to detect deception.
Deception Detection. Lying is a common occurrence—people lie one to two times a day
on average (DePaulo and Kashy 1998)—and perceptions of being deceived, regardless of reality,
can create intense negative emotional reactions (Levine, McCornack, and Avery 1992;
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McCornack and Levine 1990) and can lead to resentment, disappointment, and suspicion (Bok
2011). Yet, “behavioral cues that are discernible by human perceivers are associated with deceit
only probabilistically” (DePaulo et al. 2003). Accordingly, substantial research has focused on
the cues that people use to determine if someone is being deceptive (e.g.(Trovillo 1939)).
Much of the research on deception detection centers on verbal and nonverbal cues of
deception (Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal 1981). Eye contact (Kleinke 1986), tone of voice
(Anolli and Ciceri 1997), and facial expressions (Ekman 2003) can all indicate that deception
may be occurring (Ekman 2009). However, deception detection research also examines cues
related to the content of the potential deception, such as the amount of detail in a story (Burgoon
et al. 2003), the wordiness of a story (Zhou et al. 2004), or the compelling nature of the story
(Mehrabian 1977). Content cues often reveal more insight into what a liar is trying to hide in
addition to indicating that they are simply trying to hide something (Ekman and Friesen 1969).
Here, I examine a heretofore unexamined content cue: the presence versus absence of
coincidence in the message.
Coincidences: Actual and Ostensible. In the most objective sense, coincidences are
merely the occurrence of two or more things at the same time. However, colloquially, the term
“coincidence” conveys a sense of unexpectedness with the co-occurrence. In other words,
coincidences are not merely the co-occurrence of any two or more events—they are a cooccurrence of events that was unexpected. To this end, the Cambridge Dictionary formally
defines coincidences as events co-occurring “in a way that is unexpected or unlikely.” Dessalles
(2006) characterized such unexpected co-occurring events in terms of their generation
complexity (How many things needed to happen for the co-occurrence to arise?) and description
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complexity (How difficult is it to describe the co-occurrence?). The distinction between these two
types of complexity is best conveyed via an example.
Imagine two friends: Nick who lives in Boulder, Colorado and Dan who lives in Chicago,
Illinois. One day, Nick takes a trip to San Francisco and, as he is checking into his hotel, Dan
walks up to also check into the same hotel. Assuming that Nick and Dan had not coordinated
their travels, it is reasonable to assume that both would be pleasantly surprised by this cooccurrence. It would be quite unexpected, in fact, since neither of these friends lives near San
Francisco. Now, think of the complexity of generating this co-occurrence. Both friends would
have needed to independently decide to travel to San Francisco, plan travel accommodations
from their respective home cities, choose to stay at the same hotel, and decide to travel on the
same date. Accordingly, each friend’s reasoning in terms of location and timing are also
necessary to generate this co-occurrence. In sum, it is no simple matter that Nick and Dan
arrived at this same hotel at the same time. As they say, “What are the odds?” However, an
observer would simply need to say, “Nick and Dan were booked at the same hotel at the same
time in San Francisco,” to describe the co-occurrence. Dimulescu and Dessalles (2009) have
argued that co-occurrences of this nature—far greater generation complexity than description
complexity—are those which generate the unexpectedness so commonly associated with
coincidences.
A critical finding of Dassalles’s (2008) is that the unexpectedness of a coincidence is
diminished when the apparent generation complexity is reduced via a parsimonious explanation.
For instance, if an observer were to learn that Nick and Dan in the preceding example were both
attending the same conference, then the generation complexity would be reduced (they’d both be
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operating under the same reasoning and motivation), as would the unexpectedness of them both
arriving at the same hotel at the same time. I will return to this insight later.
While actual coincidences are interesting, the current work examines coincidences that
are conveyed indirectly (i.e., are ostensible) via a firm’s POC (the restaurant server in the earlier
example). A critical difference between actual and ostensible coincidences is that the former may
be unexpected, but it cannot be denied. In the context of the Nick and Dan example, a witness
that saw Nick and Dan arrive at the same hotel, could not deny the co-occurring events. In
contrast, while ostensible coincidences should also be unexpected, it is also true that their
veracity may be questioned.
Of interest here, are ostensible causal coincidences, which are coincidences in which the
same (or similar) outcomes for the consumer (e.g., service failures) have been repeatedly
attributed to the same cause by a firm’s POC. Critically, it is far from improbably that a systemic
issue has caused the consumer to experience these repeated service failures. Indeed, were the
cause directly observable, the consumer might readily accept the apparent coincidence given
such a parsimonious explanation, as discussed above. However, ostensible coincidences are not
observable and, instead, are conveyed by a second party—the POC—reasonably motivated to
deflect blame. Accordingly, the consumer has at their disposal two plausible parsimonious
explanations for the ostensible coincidence. On the one hand, the service failures may have in
fact all been caused by the same systemic issue. On the other hand, they may have been caused
by the POC, who has merely deflected blame to others.
I contend that, since coincidences are unexpected, ostensible causal coincidences are
perceived as suspicious and consumers are likely to doubt the authenticity of the POC’s claims in
such contexts. Therefore, in scenarios of ostensible causal coincidence (i.e., the same reason is
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given by the same POC for the same repeated service failures), when the factors of the
coincidence are highly aligned across each separate interaction, the consumer will believe the
POC less. Conversely, in scenarios of relative ostensible causal discordance (i.e., different
reasons are given by the same source for the same repeated service failures), when the factors of
the coincidence are less aligned across each separate interaction, the consumer will believe the
POC more.
Figure 1: Conceptual Map

I tested the predictions regarding ostensible causal coincidences for repeated service
failures across five studies. Study 1 demonstrates that consumers are (i) less likely to believe a
POC (a restaurant server) that presents the same reason for late orders on three repeat visits than
different reasons and (ii) more likely to blame the server presenting the same reason versus
different reasons while (iii) exonerating the kitchen staff of responsibility. Study 2, using the
same restaurant context, replicates the findings of Study 1 and concurrently examines how belief
in the reasons given for service failures changes over the course of those service failures. Study 3
generalizes these findings to a new context (visiting a hotel that was booked by a travel agent).
Study 4 demonstrates that these findings are a product of the level of coincidence by
manipulating additional factors (i.e., the number of POCs conveying the reasons for the failures)
that can mitigate the apparent coincidence of the situation. Study 5 demonstrates that consumers
will predict that a single systemic reason is the most likely cause for repeated service failures,
but still do not believe it when the single reason is presented to them by a POC.

19

Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation
STUDIES
Study 1: Coincidence and Deception Detection
In order to investigate the theory that disbelief stems from a coincidence being relayed
via a POC, an experiment was developed that placed participants in a hypothetical scenario
similar to the restaurant example in the introduction. The goals of this study were to demonstrate
the hypothesis that people are less likely to believe a single repeated reason than different
reasons for multiple service failures from the same source. Furthermore, people are more likely
to blame the source offering them a single (vs. different) reason for multiple service failures.
Study 1 further demonstrates that the reason used to explain the delay in service was not the
cause of the findings.
Table 1: Example of Reasons for Food Being Late
Date
Visit A

09/01/2015

Visit B

09/15/2015

Visit C

09/30/2015

What your server said about the wait
“The kitchen forgot about your order. I will bring your food out as
soon as it’s ready.”
“A cook dropped your food in the kitchen. I will bring your food out
as soon as it’s ready.”
“The kitchen made a mistake and had to remake your food. I will
bring your food out as soon as it’s ready.”

Method. One hundred sixty-three paid participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Twelve participants were removed from the analysis for failing to respond to
all questions, leaving one hundred fifty-one participants. Participants were asked to imagine they
had visited a local restaurant on three different occasions. During each visit the participants had
the same server and had to wait an excessively long time for their orders. Participants were
presented with a table, similar to Table 1, that either stated three different reasons for their food
being late or one reason for their food being late on each visit. Participants were randomly
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assigned to one of four conditions—the first condition presented a scenario identical to Table 1,
where a different reason was given for each delay in service (diffReas). The other three
conditions presented participants with the same reason given for the delay in service across all
visits. Each individual reason presented in the different reasons condition was represented in a
single reason condition; the kitchen forgot order (kitchenForgot), a cook dropped the order in the
kitchen (cookDrop), and the kitchen made a mistake and had to remake the order
(kitchenMistake). An example can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2: Example of Reasons for Food Being Late (kitchenForgot)
Date
Visit A

09/01/2015

Visit B

09/15/2015

Visit C

09/30/2015

What your server said about the wait
“The kitchen forgot about your order. I will bring your food out as
soon as it’s ready.”
“The kitchen forgot about your order. I will bring your food out as
soon as it’s ready.”
“The kitchen forgot about your order. I will bring your food out as
soon as it’s ready.”

Participants then indicated how much they believed the reason given for the delay during
each specific visit on an eleven point scale ranging from “completely do NOT believe (-5)” to
“completely believe (5).”On another screen participants were asked to indicate their overall
belief of the reasons the server gave for their food being late on a similar scale to the one utilized
for the prior question. On this same page they were asked to indicate server fault and kitchen
fault for the service failure on two separate eleven point scales ranging from “not the server’s
(kitchen’s) fault at all (-5)” to “completely the server’s (kitchen’s) fault at all (5).” Participants
were also asked why they believed the food was delayed during the visit to the restaurant in an
open-ended text based response question. On a separate page, participants were asked an
attention check question, their gender, and age prior to thanking them for their participation.
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Figure 2: Mean of Reason Believe Across Visits
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Results. The theory pertains to how belief responds to ostensible coincidence. Hence, this
essay does not examine raw belief in the reasons given by the server (e.g., how believable it is
that a kitchen forgets an order) but, instead, focus on the evolution of belief. Specifically, one’s
belief in the reason given for each service failure should decrease to the extent to which that
reason coincides with the reasons given for previously experienced failures. Accordingly, the
primary interest lies in how belief in the reasons given for the service failures changed from the
first visit (Visit A) to the subsequent visits (Visits B and C).
Belief in the reasons given by the server at each individual visit evolved in a manner
consistent with the prediction (Figure 2). A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, fourlevel, between-subjects “reasons” factor (diffReas vs. kitchenForgot vs. cookDrop vs.
kitchenMistake) and the three-level within-subjects repeated measure of belief in the reasons
given. The mixed-ANOVA revealed the expected interaction (F(6, 294) = 12.82, p < .001),
which indicates that participants’ belief in the reasons they were given evolved differently across
visits depending on the number of reasons they were given.
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The change in belief from Visit A to Visit B (i.e., belief after Visit B minus belief after
Visit A; hereafter, ΔVisit B) varied significantly across conditions (MdiffReas= -.72, MkitchenForgot= 2.73, McookDrop= -3.55, MkitchenMistake= -2.06, F(3,147) = 8.6, p < .0001). In the interest of brevity, I
collapsed the three single-reason conditions and contrasted them with the different-reasons
condition (the same results obtain if the different reason condition is independently contrasted
with each single reason condition). As expected, ΔVisit B was significantly less negative in the
different-reasons (vs. single-reason) condition (F(1,147) = 18.81, p < .0001). An identical
analysis of ΔVisit C (i.e., belief after Visit C minus belief after Visit A) revealed the same
pattern across all conditions (MdiffReas= -.44, MkitchenForgot= -4.37, McookDrop= -6.03, MkitchenMistake= 4.36, F(3,147) = 15.72, p < .0001) and after collapsing across the single-reason conditions
(F(1,147) = 41.85, p < .0001). Taken together these results show that consumers have
progressively less belief in repeated identical reasons for service failures. Said differently,
consumers are more likely to believe the reasons they are given for multiple service failures if
those reasons differ over the various incidences.
Figure 3: Mean of Server Belief Across Conditions
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Consistent with the predictions, participants’ overall belief (a single measure collected
after participants indicated their belief in the specific reasons given for each service failure) in
the server’s reasons also varied significantly across conditions (MdiffReas= .33, MkitchenForgot= -1.9,
McookDrop= -3.26, MkitchenMistake= -1.75, F(3,147) = 10.9, p < .0001). Participant’s overall belief in
the three reason condition differed significantly from each single reason condition—the
kitchenForgot condition (F(1,147) = 12.88, p < .0006), the cookDrop condition (F(1,147) =
32.14, p < .0001), and the kitchenMistake condition (F(1,147) = 10.50, p < .0016). These results,
illustrated in Figure 3, replicate the above visit-specific belief results, but at a more aggregate,
overall level of belief.
Discussion. The results of Study 1 support the proposition that consumers are less likely
to believe a single (vs. different) reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Study 1
also starts to develop a more compelling narrative around the observed phenomenon by
examining how belief changed over the course of visits to the restaurant and communication with
the server. However, the evolution of belief across visits was not measured over time, as the
reasons were provided. Therefore, Studies 2 will examine if the findings hold when individuals
are asked to indicate belief for individual reasons given during each visit as the service failures
are revealed.
Study 2: Deception Detection Within Subjects
Method. Eighty paid participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Two
participants were removed from the analysis due to incomplete responses (final N = 78). Similar
to Study 1, this study asked participants to imagine they had visited a local restaurant on three
different occasions. Each visit was then described one at a time, each on a separate screen. Each
visit description included an excessively long wait time and the server’s reason for that wait
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time. The participants rated their belief in the reason they were given for the long wait (on the
same scale used in Study 1, before proceeding to read about the subsequent visit. An example of
the first visit can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3: Example Reason for Food Being Late

Visit A

Date

What your server said about the wait

09/01/2015

“The kitchen forgot about your order.”

Additionally, participants were asked to indicate if the delay was the server’s fault or the
kitchen’s fault after reading about each visit. Furthermore, participants were asked in an open
text item to indicate the reason they believed their food was delayed during that specific visit.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the first condition a
different reason was given for each delay in service (diffReas). In the other condition,
participants were given the same reason for the delay in service across all visits (sameReas). For
simplicity, I chose to include only one single-reason condition, which used “the kitchen forgot
the order” reason for all service failures.
Figure 4: Mean of Server Belief Across Conditions and Visits
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Results. Consistent with the results of Study 1, a mixed ANOVA revealed a significant
interaction between the two-level, between-subjects “reasons” factor (one vs. different reasons)
and the repeated within-subjects measure of belief (F(2,156) = 4.40, p < .02)—more specifically,
participants who were shown the same reason for their food being delayed during each visit
began to believe their server less in a more exaggerated manner than those in the differentreasons condition (Figure 4). Contrasting belief across conditions at each visit, we see that the
difference in the participants’ belief in the server’s reason given during their second visit (ΔVisit
B) did not differ significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -1.80, MdiffReas= -.58, F(1,78) 2.18 = p
> .14). However, the difference in the participants’ belief in the server’s reason given during
their third visit (ΔVisit C) differed significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -3.88, MdiffReas= 1.45, F(1,78) 6.95 = p < .02). These findings replicate the pattern of belief results from Study 1.
Figure 5: Mean of Server Fault Across Conditions and Visits
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Fault was analyzed in the same manner as was belief. As seen in Figure 5, the evolution
of server’s fault follows a reverse pattern to that of belief—in that it escalates over time.
Participants’ evolution of the fault they placed on the server for their delayed food, analyzed via
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a mixed ANOVA, differed significantly across conditions (F(2,156) = 7.14, p < .002). More
specifically, participants who were shown the same reason for their food being delayed during
each visit began to blame their server in a more exaggerated manner than those in the different
reasons condition. The difference in the participants’ attribution of fault to server during their
second visit (ΔVisit B) varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= 1.50, MdiffReas= -1.00,
F(1,78) 12.01 = p < .001). Similarly, difference in the participants’ attribution of fault to server
during their third visit (ΔVisit C) varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= 2.58,
MdiffReas= -.45, F(1,78) 7.21 = p < .009).
Figure 6: Mean of Kitchen Fault Across Conditions and Visits
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Finally, as illustrated in Figure 6, the evolution of kitchen’s fault follows the reverse
pattern to that of server fault. Participants’ evolution of the fault they placed on the kitchen for
their delayed food, per a mixed ANOVA, differed significantly across conditions (F(2,156) =
5.44, p < .006). More specifically, participants who were shown the same reason for their food
being delayed during each visit began to exonerate the kitchen of fault more than those in the
different reasons condition. The difference in the participants’ attribution of fault to kitchen
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during their second visit varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -1.65, MdiffReas= -.05,
F(1,78) 4.05 = p < .05). Similarly, difference in the participant’s attribution of fault to kitchen
during their third visit varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -3.30, MdiffReas= -.78,
F(1,78) 8.62 = p < .005).
Discussion. The results of Study 2 support the theory that consumers are less likely to
believe a single reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Further this study
demonstrates that these findings hold when measuring belief as the events unfold while
solidifying the more business oriented dependent variable of fault. Study 3 examines whether
these findings generalize to contexts other than the restaurant context examined thus far.
Study 3: Deception Detection vs. Unbelievable Reason (Hotel Context)
Study 3 was designed to generalize the results of the preceding studies to a new context.
Specifically, two aspects of the study were changed. First, I stepped away from the restaurant
context into a context in which participants were asked to imagine that they are often required to
travel to a foreign city for work using the same travel coordinator to book the same hotel. Thus, I
changed the setting of the service failure. Second, since the travel coordinator and the hotel do
not represent a single firm, I have also shifted from a single-firm context to a two-firm context.
As in the previous studies, the participant still hypothetically interacted with a single POC (i.e.,
the travel coordinator). But, as opposed to the previous studies, the third party (which would
ultimately be blamed for repeated service failures by the POC) was a hotel for which the travel
coordinator was not employed. While this context does differ from the other studies, it retains the
essential elements of those studies and, thus, I predicted that the results of the preceding studies
would be replicated.
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Method. One hundred thirty-one paid participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Eight participants were removed from the analysis due to incomplete
responses (final N = 123). In a deviation from the other studies conducted throughout this paper,
this study asked participants to imagine that they had upcoming business trips to Madrid, Spain.
Their company had instructed them to book their itinerary through the same travel coordinator
each trip, whom then booked the participants at the same hotel. Upon arrival for each business
trip, the participants were told they had to wait an excessively long time for their room to be
available. During these waits the travel coordinator talked to the hotel staff over the phone.
Participants were then told that the coordinator gave them the reason for their long wait for each
stay.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions—the first condition gave
different reasons for each delay in service (diffReas—“The hotel had lost your reservation,”
“The hotel had booked your reservation under the wrong name,” “The hotel had booked your
reservation for the wrong dates”). The other condition gave participants the same reason given
for the delay in service across all visits (sameReas—“The hotel had lost your reservation”).
After seeing a table of these reasons for each visit, the participants were asked to indicate to what
extent they believed the reason the travel coordinator gave for the delay in service on a scale
similar to that of Study 1 and 2.
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Figure 7: Mean of Travel Agent Belief Across Conditions and Visits
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Results. Consistent with the results of Study 1 and 2, a mixed-analysis ANOVA revealed
a significant interaction between the between-subjects “reasons” factor and the repeated withinsubjects measure of belief (F(2,242) = 16.21, p < .0001; Figure 7): participants who were shown
the same reason for their room being delayed during each visit began to believe their travel agent
less in a more exaggerated manner than those in the different reasons condition. The difference
in the participant’s belief (Δ) in the travel coordinator’s reason given related to their second visit
varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -2.42, MdiffReas= -.85, F(1,121) 14.40 = p <
.0002). Consistently, the difference in the participant’s belief in the travel coordinator’s reason
given related their third visit varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -4.17, MdiffReas= 1.34, F(1,121) 18.51 = p < .0001). During both the second and third visits, the travel
coordinator’s reason for the delay in their room was less believable if participants were given the
same reason as the previous visit.
Discussion. The results of Study 3 support the theory that consumers are less likely to
believe a single reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Further this study
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demonstrates that these findings hold within a different context and for scenarios where the POC
and source of the ostensible cause of the service failure are not within the same firm.
Study 4: Deception Detection Changing the Messenger
The previous studies have demonstrated that ostensible coincidence is a cue people use to
detect deception. I have even been able to moderate this effect through varying the degree of
coincidence by having the same server give different (vs. the same) reasons for three service
failures. Study 4 accomplishes a similar moderation through the variation of another component
of the coincidence: the server. If the server is different across the three visits, the level of
perceived coincidence diminishes and so should the perception of deception.
Method. One hundred seventy paid participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Five participants were removed from the analysis due to incomplete responses leaving a
total of one hundred sixty-five participants included in the analysis. Similar to the first study, this
study asked participants to imagine they had visited a local restaurant on three different
occasions and had to wait an excessively long time for their orders. Participants were randomly
assigned to conditions in a 2 (server: same vs. different) vs. 2 (reasons: same vs. different). Thus,
participants ended up in four possible scenarios: either they had (i) a different server each visit
that gave them a different reason for each service failure, (ii) the same server each visit that gave
them the same reason for each service failure, (iii) the same server each visit that gave them a
different reason for each service failure, or (iv) a different server each visit that gave them the
same reason for each service failure. An example of what participants saw can be seen in Table
4.

31

Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation
Table 4: Example Reason for Food Being Late
Date
Visit
A
Visit
B
Visit
C

Server

What your server said about the wait

09/01/2015 Charlie

“The kitchen forgot about your order.”

09/15/2015 Landry

“A cook dropped your food in the kitchen”

09/30/2015

Skyler

“The kitchen made a mistake and had to remake your food.”

Server names were selected on the basis that they could be either male or female names
as to not bias the results. In the same server conditions, Charlie was the server as this is generally
considered the most androgynous name.
Similar to study 1, participants rated the extent to which they believed the reasons for all
service failures on one screen, then indicated how much they believed the overall reasons the
server(s) gave for their food being late. Further, participants were asked to indicate to what
extent they believed the food being delayed was the server’s fault or the kitchen’s fault during
each individual visit. Participants were also asked to respond to an open ended question and
indicate why they believed their food was delayed.
Results. In a divergence from the formatting of other studies within this paper, I look at
overall belief across visit first in this Study 4. I do this because most readers will find all the
information they need to inform them of the outcome of this study from this simple measure;
however, for readers looking to fully understand the change in belief across visit, that
information follows.
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Figure 8: Mean of Overall Believe Across Conditions
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The number of servers (same vs. different) and number of reasons (same vs. different) did
not significantly interact to influence participants’ overall beliefs in the reasons they were given
(F(1,160) = .06, p > .8). However, consistent with the predictions and the visit-specific belief
results, participants’ overall belief was significantly lower when they received the same (vs.
different) reasons (M = -1.98 vs. .24; F(1,160) = 23.12, p < .0001) and when those reasons were
supplied by a single server (vs. different servers; M = -2.08 vs. .30; F(1,160) = 27.12, p < .0001).
These results are particularly interesting because they demonstrate that changing the server while
keeping the reason constant or changing the reason while keeping the server constant across
visits systematically affects participant’s belief in the reason given for the service failure in a
similar way. The full pattern of these results is presented in Figure 8. Thus, giving the theory that
the level of coincidence is responsible for detecting deception in these scenarios.
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Table 5: Mean of Change in Belief and Fault Across Conditions and Visits

Believe
Kitchen Fault
Server Fault

Server

Different

Different

Same

Same

Reason
ΔVisit B
ΔVisit C
ΔVisit B
ΔVisit C
ΔVisit B
ΔVisit C

Different
-0.44
-0.05
0.80
0.46
-2.10
-1.12

Same
-1.73
-2.80
-0.78
-1.08
0.48
0.65

Different
-1.68
-1.89
-0.03
-0.50
-0.71
-0.18

Same
-2.73
-5.51
-2.67
-4.96
2.40
4.40

A mixed ANOVA of the between-subjects factors server (same vs. different) and reason
(same vs. different), and the repeated within-subjects measure of belief revealed a significant
interaction between server and belief (F(2,320) = 10.67, p < .0004) and between reason and
belief (F(2,320) = 21.32, p < .0001). However, the three-way interaction between server, reason,
and belief was not significant (F(2,320) = .69, p > .45). In combination, these results reveal that
the two potential sources of coincidence in this scenario (same server and same reasons)
additively influence participants’ belief in the reasons they are given. Varying either the number
of sources (servers in this study) or number of reasons independently influences consumers’
beliefs.
When looking at how participant’s beliefs evolved across visits, we see the expected
pattern of results. ΔVisit B belief (the change in belief from Visit A to Visit B) was significantly
more negative when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different servers: M = -2.25
vs. -1.07; F(1, 163) = 5.70, p < .02). Likewise, ΔVisit B belief was significantly more negative
when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M = -2.26 vs. -1.04; F(1, 163)
= 6.12, p < .02), replicating the previous results. This pattern persisted and strengthened for
ΔVisit C belief (the change in belief from Visit A to Visit C). ΔVisit C belief was significantly
more negative when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different servers: M = -3.86
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vs. -1.41; F(1, 163) = 13.34, p < .0004). Likewise, ΔVisit C belief was significantly more
negative when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M = -4.24 vs. -.94;
F(1, 163) = 26.05, p < .0001) , replicating the previous results. Number of servers and number of
reasons did not significantly interact for either ΔVisit B (F(1, 163) = .06, p > .80) or ΔVisit C
(F(1, 163) = .48, p > .49).
A mixed ANOVA of the between-subjects factors server (same vs. different) and reason
(same vs. different), and the repeated within-subjects measure of server-fault revealed a
significant interaction between server and sever-fault (F(2,320) = 13.58, p < .0001) and between
reason and server-fault (F(2,320) = 28.52, p < .0001). The three-way interaction between server,
reason, and server-fault was significant as well (F(2,320) = 5.21, p < .02). In combination, these
results reveal that (i) the two potential sources of coincidence in this scenario (same server and
same reasons) additively influence participants’ attribution of fault to the server and (i) varying
the coincidental factors of server and reason have a combined influence on how participants
attribute fault to the server.
ΔVisit B server-fault (the change in faulting the server from Visit A to Visit B) was
significantly more positive when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different
servers: M = .98 vs. -.83; F(1, 163) = 13.70, p < .0004). Likewise, ΔVisit B server-fault was
significantly more positive when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M
= 1.49 vs. -1.43; F(1, 163) = 40.34, p < .0001). This pattern persisted and strengthen for ΔVisit C
server-fault (the change in faulting the server from Visit A to Visit C). ΔVisit C server-fault was
significantly more positive when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different
servers: M = 2.30 vs. -.25; F(1, 163) = 17.50, p < .0001). Likewise, ΔVisit C server-fault was
significantly more positive when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M

35

Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation
= 2.64 vs. -.67; F(1, 163) = 32.17, p < .0001). Number of servers and number of reasons did not
significantly interacted for ΔVisit B (F(1, 163) = 2.96, p > .54) but did significantly interact for
ΔVisit C (F(1, 163) = 80.76, p < .02).
A mixed ANOVA of the between-subjects factors server (same vs. different) and reason
(same vs. different), and the repeated within-subjects measure of kitchen-fault revealed a
significant interaction between server and kitchen-fault (F(2,320) = 15.74, p < .0001) and
between reason and kitchen-fault (F(2,320) = 25.32, p < .0001). The three-way interaction
between server, reason, and kitchen-fault was significant as well (F(2,320) = 5.82, p < .009). In
combination, these results reveal that (i) the two potential sources of coincidence in this scenario
(same server and same reasons) additively influence participants’ attribution of fault to the
kitchen and (i) varying the coincidental factors of server and reason have a combined influence
on how participants attribute fault to the kitchen.
ΔVisit B kitchen-fault (the change in faulting the server from Visit A to Visit B) was
significantly more negative when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different
servers: M = -1.46 vs. .02; F(1, 163) = 11.23, p < .001). Likewise, ΔVisit B kitchen-fault was
significantly more negative when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M
= -1.78 vs. .41; F(1, 163) = 26.98, p < .001). This pattern persisted and strengthen for ΔVisit C
kitchen-fault (the change in faulting the server from Visit A to Visit C). ΔVisit C kitchen-fault
was significantly more negative when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different
servers: M = -2.92 vs. -.30; F(1, 163) = 19.52, p < .0001). Likewise, ΔVisit C kitchen-fault was
significantly more negative when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M
= -3.13 vs. 0; F(1, 163) = 29.88, p < .001). Number of servers and number of reasons did not
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significantly interacted for ΔVisit B (F(1, 163) = 11.48, p > .19) but did significantly interact for
ΔVisit C (F(1, 163) = 86.90, p < .009).
Figure 9: Mean of Server/Kitchen Fault Across Visits
in the Same-Server-Same-Reason Condition
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Although previously shown in Study 2, since I measured the server’s fault for each
individual visit within the current study we can see that as the server is blamed more in the sameserver-same-reason condition, the kitchen is exonerated of blame as depicted in Figure 9.
Discussion. The results of Study 4 support the claim that consumers are less likely to
believe a single reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Further this study
demonstrates that these findings are a product of the level of coincidence. By changing the server
and the reasons across visits, there are less coincidental factors and participants detected less
deception. Study 4 further demonstrates that the server will be blamed more for the service
failure as coincidental elements manifest. Further, Study 4 corroborates the findings of Study 3
by showing that as participants place blame on the messenger they also alleviate blame from the
ostensible cause.

37

Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation
Study 5: Prediction vs. Belief
Study 5 contrasts participant’s predictions about the reason for a service failure with their
belief of that reason, or lack-there-of. It is quite reasonable that a consumer experience repeated
service failures for a systemic reason. However, when such a seemingly systemic reason is given
to them by an individual (the POC) plausibly motivated to avoid blame, they tend to discount its
likelihood and, thus, not believe the POC or the reasons given. If true, then we should see that
consumers expect a single reason explains repeated (and similar) service failures, yet still be
surprised and express disbelief if they are told that this is the case.
Method. As part of a series of unrelated experiments, I recruited two hundred fourteen
paid participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Twenty-one participants were removed from
the analysis due to incomplete responses leaving a total of one hundred ninety-three participants.
Similar to the first study, this study asked participants to imagine they had visited a local
restaurant on three different occasions and had to wait an excessively long time for their orders.
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which they were asked to
imagine a scenario similar to that in the single-reason conditions of previous studies. An example
of this belief condition can be seen in Table 6.
Table 6: Example Reason for Food Being Late

Visit
A
Visit
B
Visit
C

Date

Server

What your server said about the wait

two weeks
ago

Charlie

“The kitchen forgot about your order.”

last week

Charlie

“The kitchen forgot about your order.”

today

Charlie

“The kitchen forgot about your order.”
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The other half of the participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which they
were asked to imagine a scenario in which the server gave them the same reason for their first
two visits to the restaurant and, although their food was delayed on the third visit, the server had
yet to give them a reason. An example of this prediction condition can be seen in Table 7.
Table 7: Example Reason for Food Being Late

Visit
A
Visit
B
Visit
C

Date

Server

What your server said about the wait

two weeks
ago

Charlie

“The kitchen forgot about your order.”

last week

Charlie

“The kitchen forgot about your order.”

today

Charlie

--

Participants in both conditions were then asked, “What do you believe caused your food
to be late today?” and were further randomly assigned to two other conditions. The first
condition gave participants four options to choose from when answering the previous question.
These consisted of the following: “The kitchen forgot about my order;” “A cook dropped my
food in the kitchen;” “The kitchen made a mistake and had to remake my food;” and “The server
(Charlie) was in some way responsible.” This condition was the closed-end condition. In the
open-end condition, participants were given the same first three options to respond to what
caused their food to be late; however, the final option was changed to an open-end response field
that allowed participants to specify any cause. I theorized that if the participants are to predict the
cause of their food being late on their third visit to the restaurant, they will predict the most
likely cause to be the coincidental cause for a service delay. However, we theorized that
participants in an identical parallel scenario that were given reasons by a server would not
believe the coincidental cause is the actual cause of their service delay.
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Results. The overwhelming majority of people in the prediction condition indicated that
the cause of their food being delayed is that the kitchen forgot to make their order (closed-end:
62% and open-end: 98%). In contrast, significantly fewer participants in the belief condition
actually believed that the kitchen forgot to make their order when that was the reason the server
presented them (closed-end: 23% and open-end: 58%). This demonstrates that although a
systemic cause makes the most probable sense for a repeat service failure, when this cause is
presented by a motivated source (the POC), it constitutes an ostensible coincidence that
consumers tend to not believe. Further, participants predicted the server was the cause for their
food being late a fraction of the time (closed-end: 38% and open-end: 2%). However, when the
server gave them a reason for their food being late that aligned with this prediction, they tended
to say the server was the cause for their delayed food (closed-end: 67% and open-end: 25%).
This demonstrates that not only do consumers not believe a coincidental cause for a service
failure but they also tend to attribute blame the POC.
Discussion. The results of Study 5 support the assertion that consumers are less likely to
believe a single reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Study 5 also supports the
proposal that it is more probable that a systemic issue is causing the repeat service failures by
demonstrating that consumers will predict that the single reason is the most likely cause for the
service failure. However, these participants do not believe it when the single reason is presented
to them as the reason for the service failure.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this research, I examined the extent to which consumers’ beliefs of the claims made by
a point of contact (POC) evolved over repeated service failures. I drew on literature from
deception detection (Ekman and Friesen 1969; Ekman 2009) and coincidence (Dessalles 2006;
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Dessalles 2008; Dimulescu and Dessalles 2009) to propose that consumers are more likely to
believe a POC when the POC gives different (vs. the same) reasons for each of the service
failures. Specifically, I established that ostensible coincidences (the same reason given
repeatedly for service failures) provided by the POC lead consumers to discount these
explanations for the service failures. Consumers find ostensible coincidences less believable
although these coincidences suggest a systemic cause for the service failure that is both more
likely and more expected by the consumer a priori (study 5). Further, when presented with an
ostensible coincidence, consumers are more likely to blame the POC for the service failure.
Theoretical Implications. Paramount to the fundamental goal of consumer behavior
literature, I utilized the phenomenon of ostensible coincidences to further understand the nature
and behaviors of consumers. This research introduces the concept of coincidence to the academic
marketing literature. Moreover, this research contributes to the literature on deception detection,
by showing how the previously unexamined content cue of ostensible coincidence influences
deception detection, and the literature on coincidence, by developing a link between coincidence
and the social construct of disbelief through ostensible coincidences. Lastly, attribution literature
and service failure literature benefit from the understanding this research provides around
attributions of blame after the portrayal of coincidence via a POC.
Managerial Implications. Firms could benefit directly from this research. As mentioned
in the introduction, many firms appoint a representative to handle all of a particular consumer’s
needs. Although this undoubtedly has benefits explored in other research, this could have
potentially negative consequences when considering the findings presented here. This
phenomenon combined with the transparent business culture that is often promoted as a best
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practice today, could lead to ostensible coincidences for repeat service failures. Thus, leading to
a greater likelihood that consumers begin to distrust their service representative.
Review of Key Findings. Across differing contexts, I reveal that consumers are less likely
to believe a POC that presents the same (vs. different) reason for repeat service failures and more
likely to blame the POC presenting the same reason versus different reasons while exonerating
the ostensible cause of responsibility. I show that consumers predict a systemic cause as the
reason for multiple service failures; however, if the systemic reason is presented repeatedly by
the same POC for multiple service failures, the consumer does not believe it.
Alternative Explanations. The studies presented within this paper support the conceptual
framework and predictions. However, past research related to deception detection could have
potentially predicted similar outcomes without the use of coincidence. Truthful people tend to
take their perceived integrity for granted while liars commonly attempt to appear trustworthy
(DePaulo, LeMay, and Epstein 1991). Thus, participants could have seen blaming the kitchen as
an attempt to appear credible and concluded that the server is trying to deceive them. Although,
one would imagine that the condition in which different reasons were given would appear more
deceitful in the study if this were the only mechanism acting on belief and deception detection—
since presenting different reasons could appear as an attempt to appear credible. Furthermore,
liars tend to display an augmented other-focus (Ickes, Reidhead, and Patterson 1986) while using
first-person singular pronouns less regularly (Newman et al. 2003) in an attempt to detach
themselves from their lie. Therefore, placing blame on the kitchen could appear to be a telltale
sign of deceit. However, if this mechanism was at work, one would imagine it would affect
believability in all conditions of the study equally given that the POC always blames the kitchen.
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Limitation and Future Direction. As we navigate our everyday lives, unexpected events
occur often. Within the experimental design employed in this paper, the comparison highlighting
the coincidence leading to unexpectedness is unambiguous—it is easy to compare the reasons
given across multiple services failure when they are presented without any noise. In a “real
world” setting, this comparison might be less apparent—in addition, many other factors may
pollute such observations. Therefore, one might argue that these findings might not hold in the
dramatically more intricate setting of everyday life. I contend that the results would hold to the
extent to which a consumer perceives an ostensible coincidence, and that may be influenced by
many factors such as the consumers’ memory of past events and cues in the environment that
might facilitate the recall of such an event. Broadly speaking, I argue that the phenomena
detailed within this research can be manipulated to be more or less salient—in fact, this salience
is a driving force in determining if a coincidence is unexpected or not. After all, a coincidence
would not be influential in determining belief or perceptions of deceit if the coincidence is not
recognized. Thus, examining how these contextual factors might be accentuated and
unexpectedness achieved or avoided is an important direction for future research.
One might also take exception with the hypothetical nature of the experiments. Indeed,
consumers might respond differently in incentive-compatible conditions. The magnitude of the
effects would likely be larger in real versus hypothetical conditions for the phenomena being
examined here, as has been the case in other domains (Kivetz and Simonson 2002). Hence, the
results here may very well be muted relative to what would be expected if a consumer personal
welfare was actually at stake. That said, future researchers may very well wish to determine the
robustness of the current results in contexts in which the consumer may actually gain or lose via
repeated interactions with the firm.
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Admittedly, this research could benefit from a more managerial-oriented dependent
variable—firm trust, customer loyalty, customer satisfaction, brand switching, and willingness to
return are all dependent variables for future research that ostensible coincidence could potentially
impact. This is apparent when we consider the practices of business transparency and assigning a
single service representative to a customer. Although there is a plethora of research that already
demonstrates that the relationship a consumer has with a firm’s representative will affect their
relationship with the firm (i.e., (Hallowell 1996; Winer 2001)), establishing this link directly
with instances of ostensible coincidence would be ideal.
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CHAPTER 3:
Who Do I Believe Now? The Influence of Scarcity Presentation on Credibility and Purchase
Behavior

Firms communicate with consumers through a variety of actions ranging from
multifaceted mass-media advertising campaigns to simple shelf layout decisions. Media literate
consumers are skeptical of most communication presented by a firm—consumers are becoming
more keenly aware that all communication, no matter how seemingly trivial, is thoughtfully
designed to coerce them into thinking, feeling, or doing something in relation to the firm that is
the source of the message. As e-commerce takes a larger share of consumers’ wallets, traditional
interactions (e.g. salespersons calling on consumers) between the firm and the consumer are
replaced by websites and applications. As digital means of acquiring goods and services become
more commonplace than direct interaction with a salesperson in a brick-and-mortar setting,
consumers may assume there is less chance for the firm to use persuasive tactics of them. In
reality, consumers might more susceptible to firms’ persuasive strategies in this scenario.
One such example of coercive communication prevalent in websites is scarcity signals. In
marketing, scarcity is a well-researched topic—we know that the scarcity of goods and services
affect consumer behavior. Marketing scholars have identified that scarcity increases purchase
behavior because consumers infer that scarcer products are of higher popularity or quality (Van
Herpen, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2009), consumers typically choose popular products since they
think other consumers are more knowledgeable (Cialdini 1993), scarcity enhances the perceived
value of products and opportunities (Cialdini and Garde 1987), and scarcity induces arousal and
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this heightened arousal polarizes the evaluations of individual items contained in the choice set
(Zhu and Ratner 2015). Prior research demonstrates that scarcity signals relative to a firm’s
product tend to have an impact on product choice in favor of the firm.
Firms are well aware of the effects of scarcity and utilize them as sales tactics to persuade
consumers, even going as far as communicating artificial scarcity of products and services (Kain
2017). Companies communicate scarcity signals for products to create a sense of urgency, in
hopes of impulse purchases, where such scarcity might not exist in reality. There are numerous
web posts that question the authenticity of the message, “Only 1 Left in Stock—Order Soon”
(""Only One Left!"—the Latest Online Marketing Ploy" 2014). Conversely, in some cases,
consumers assume scarcity signals communicated by the firm are objective or inherently valid.
This research focuses on understanding one driving factor in whether increasingly skeptical and
media-literate consumers are susceptible to being coerced by scarcity signals controlled directly
by the firm.
Consider the following simple yet familiar scenario. A consumer visits an airline’s
website to purchase a ticket for upcoming travel. The consumer finds a direct flight with an
acceptable departure time and is presented with a message that indicates there is a limited
number of seats remaining on the flight. The consumer could reasonably believe this message
and treat the scarcity signal as credible, thus, placing an additional impetus to act fast and reserve
a seat before it is no longer an option. Contrariwise, the consumer could view this message as a
ploy by the airline to get consumers to book the ticket immediately rather than wait to see if the
price drops or price shop other competing airlines. With this context in mind, imagine that
instead of seeing a message about a limited number of seats remaining the consumer saw a
graphic representing the seat availability in the cabin of the aircraft and only a limited number of
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seats were highlighted as available. In both scenarios, the scarcity signal originated from and is
controlled by the same source—the airline. However, is one message perceived as more
believable by consumers? If so, what makes one scarcity signal more believable than another?
Finally, does this belief translate into different purchasing patterns?
Across multiple studies, I focus on firms’ different approaches to communicating scarcity
signals and how these signals are perceived by consumers. Objectively speaking, scarcity signals
originate and are controlled by the same source—the firm. Therefore, each signal should be met
with equal consumer skepticism. Yet, I predict that consumers are more likely to perceive a
scarcity signal as believable under certain conditions. I argue that if the consumer is an active
agent in uncovering or interpreting the scarcity signal, they will perceive the signal as more
authentic. Furthermore, in accordance with scarcity literature, the believable scarcity signal will
favorably affect purchase intentions and behaviors for the firm.
THEORY
Extant research has examined persuasion in a plethora of contexts. It is unsurprising then
that belief is a headlining construct of interest in much research on persuasion (Friestad and
Wright 1995) and advertising (Mitchell and Olson 2000). Conversely, belief is often either
ignored or taken for granted in research on other, generally considered, non-persuasive firmconsumer communication domains. Yet, it would be erroneous to assume that consumers
inherently believe claims generated by the firm in non-persuasion contexts. In fact, any context
in which a firm might benefit from dishonesty is one in which consumer disbelief may arise
(Fein and Hilton 1994; Fein 1996; Fein, Hilton, and Miller 1990; Main, Dahl, and Darke 2007).
Furthermore, research does show that a brand’s credibility affects the formation of consideration
sets (Erdem and Swait 2004). Therefore, consumers are likely to recognize that what they are
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told and what actually is might differ. Hence, consumers may have grounds to disbelieve firm
generated messages.
Persuasion. The Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) investigates consumers’
awareness about the strategies and tactics that firms employ to convince them to buy a product
and the motives behind such strategies (Friestad and Wright 1994). This model begins to address
consumers’ personal knowledge related to firm’s goals and tactics. Consumers refine their
knowledge on persuasive tactics and manage persuasive messages while dynamically adjusting
their attitudes toward the product and the firm. If we apply PKM to both conditions in the
previous airline example, we begin to have an understanding of the active variables at work in
either coercing consumers to act on or ignore scarcity signals. Perhaps consumers already have
knowledge associated with explicit scarcity signals (i.e. “Only one remaining, act now!”). This
cue could be seen as intended by the firm to mean the product is scarce or could be seen as a cue
that the firm is simply trying to get you to purchase the firm’s goods or services quickly. While
the more implicit method of allowing the consumer to infer scarcity does not conjure this same
knowledge because it is not registered as a persuasive attempt. But why would this be the case if
the source of information is the same? Perhaps, as far as the consumer is concerned, the source
of the information is not the same.
Activation Template. The consumer, being actively involved in discovering a scarcity
signal, will no longer perceive that the signal came from the firm but that they are responsible for
uncovering it. The effort of interpretation shifts the perceived message source from external to
internal. The activation template, or the activation version of the interactive experiment template,
comes from Goldenberg et al.’s work to understand creativity (1999a, 1999b). The authors argue
that requiring a consumer to engage in an interactive experience with a persuasive message will
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be thought of as more creative and encourages comprehension of the message (Goldenberg,
Mazursky, and Solomon 1999a). Although there is empirical evidence that messages or products
crafted through this template are thought of as more creative (Goldenberg, Mazursky, and
Solomon 1999b), there is little empirical evidence that messages or products crafted with this
template are more persuasive or, critically, more believable. However, this research aims to
rectify this—at least in relation to scarcity signals.
I attempt to show that when one applies the activation template to scarcity signals, the
consumer will distribute cognitive resources to understanding the signal and not to understanding
the underlying coercive nature of the signal. Thus, the consumer will systematically reach an
understanding that the product is scarce but will not treat this scarcity signal in accordance with a
persuasive message in PKM. Therefore, consumers in the example that are presented with a
graphic representing the limited seat availability in the cabin of the aircraft will uncover the
scarcity of the available seats for themselves. Thus, in this condition, the consumer will assume
they must make a purchase decision quickly. Conversely, when a consumer is presented with an
explicit scarcity signal (ie. “Only 3 Seats Left!”), they will question the credibility of the source
and believability of the message in accordance with PKM. This will ultimately be incorporated
in their decision process.
Explicit Scarcity Signal and Believability. Consumers are skeptical towards a firm
generated message, and skepticism negatively affects believability. Consumers are plausibly
aware that explicit scarcity messages are a sales tactic, which decreases believability of this
tactic in the future according to PKM. Content and valence of these positive or negative thoughts
depends on the information that is available to the consumer at the time of evaluation (Feldman
and Lynch 1988). Importantly, when consumers become aware of persuasion attempts directed at
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them, they often use their persuasion knowledge to resist these attempts, hence consumers would
be relatively less likely to choose scarcer alternatives (Friestad and Wright 1994). I argue that
explicit scarcity signals trigger this coping behavior in consumers.
H1: Communicating with consumers through explicit scarcity signals has a negative
effect on believability of the message, which decreases purchase likelihood, because it is
perceived as a persuasion attempt on behalf of the firm.
Implicit Scarcity Signal and Believability. Friestad and Wright suggest that as a
consumer’s familiarity with a persuasion coping task increases, the cognitive effort they expend
to do those coping tasks decreases and aspects of their coping behavior become automatic
(1994). Additionally, scarcity tends to impact choices among consumer goods only when
consumers believe that market forces have caused that scarcity (Verhallen and Robben 1994;
Worchel, Lee, and Adewole 1975). Since explicit scarcity signals will be interpreted as a
persuasion attempt, the believability will decrease, and therefore scarcity will be perceived as an
artificial phenomenon instead of a natural one (i.e. market forces causing scarcity). The opposite
is expected to hold for implicit scarcity signals—since it is the consumer who inferred the
scarcity through cognitive elaboration, they perceive the information is not coming from the
same source. Presence of an implicit scarcity signal will involve consumers in discovering the
scarcity signal through increased cognitive effort. This involvement will allow the consumer to
treat the scarcity signal as a non-persuasive message. Thus, the consumer will not register a
persuasive attempt and draw on their persuasive knowledge but instead will apply credibility to
the scarcity signal. Ultimately, the purchase likelihood of the consumer will be greater with an
implicit scarcity signal.
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H2: Communicating with consumer through implicit scarcity signals has a positive effect
on believably of the message, which increases purchase likelihood, because it is not perceived as
a persuasion attempt by the firm and the scarcity signal is perceived as discovered by the
consumer.
STUDIES
Figure 10: Graphic showing Available Seats in an Aircraft

Study 1: Indirect vs. Direct Scarcity Signals – Airline Scenario
In order to investigate this hypotheses, the experiment placed participants in a
hypothetical scenario similar to the airline example in the introduction. The goal of this study is
demonstrate that implicit and explicit scarcity signals differ in consumers’ perception.
Specifically, consumers are less likely to believe explicit (vs. implicit) scarcity signals.
Furthermore, consumers are less likely to purchase when exposed to an explicit (vs. implicit)
scarcity signal.
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Figure 11: Graphic showing Available Seats in an Aircraft in Text

Method. One hundred and thirty-six paid participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Two participants were removed from the analysis for failing to respond to all
questions, leaving one hundred and thirty-four participants. Participants were asked to imagine
they had an upcoming optional business trip and had been instructed to book your domestic
flight using your company credit card; therefore, price is no concern. Upon visiting the company
designated airlines website to check for available tickets, the consumer found an available nonstop flight in the main cabin.
Participants were then randomly assigned conditions in a 2 (plane schematic: yes vs. no)
v. 2 (explicit scarcity: yes vs. no). Thus, participants ended up in four possible scenarios: either
they were presented with a graphic showing the available seats in an aircraft, Figure 10
(implicitPicture), presented with a graphic showing the same available seats in a text based
format, Figure 11 (implicitText), showed the same graphic as the first condition except it
featured red text that stated, “Hurry up! Only 3 seats are left” (explicitPicture), or showed the
same graphic as the second condition except it featured red text that stated, “Hurry up! Only 3
seats are left” (explicitText).
Participants then indicated how likely they were to purchase a ticket on a seven-point
scale ranging from “Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely Likely 7”. On another page,
participants were asked if they believed the messaging regarding the seats offered by the airline
(“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). Furthermore, on the same page,
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participants were asked to what extent their purchase decision was influenced by the seat
locations, seat availability, and number of seats in three separate measures (“Not At All
Influenced 1” – “Entirely Influenced 7”). Lastly, participants were asked to what extent they felt
pressured to make the purchase by the airline (“Not At All Pressured 1” – “Entirely Pressured
7”). On a separate screen, participants were asked their gender and age prior to thanking them for
their participation.
Figure 12: Mean of Purchase Across Conditions
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Results. A mixed ANOVA of the between-subjects factors plane schematic (yes vs. no)
and the between-subjects measure of purchase likelihood revealed a significant difference
(F(1,130) = 4.14, p < .05). Analysis of the between-subjects factors explicit scarcity statement
(yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of purchase likelihood revealed a significant
difference (F(1,130) = 9.71, p < .003). Finally the analysis of the between-subjects factors plane
schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no), and the between-subjects
measure of purchase likelihood revealed a significant interaction (F(1,130) = 4.33, p < .04). In
combination, these results reveal that (i) the two potential sources scarcity signals in this scenario
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additively influence participants’ likelihood to purchase and (ii) varying the scarcity factors have
a combined influence on participants’ likelihood to purchase.
A contrast between the implicit and explicit conditions showing the schematic of the
plane demonstrates a significant difference in likelihood of purchase (F(1, 130) = 13.51, p <
.0004). Thus, participants are significantly more likely to purchase a seat when presented with an
implicit than an explicit scarcity signal in relation to the schematic of the plane. A similar
contrast between the implicit and explicit text conditions shows no significant difference (F(1,
130) = .54, p > .45). Thus, there is no evidence that participants are more likely to purchase a
seat on the plane when shown an implicit than an explicit scarcity signal in relation to the text.
Interestingly, a contrast between the explicit schematic of the plan and the explicit text shows a
significant difference (F(1, 130) = 8.67, p < .004). These results demonstrate that participants are
more likely to purchase a seat on the plane when showed the explicit scarcity signal paired with
text than paired with a schematic of the plane.
Figure 13: Mean of Message Belief Across Conditions
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As shown in Figure 13, the analysis on the manipulated between-subjects factors plane
schematic (yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of message belief revealed no
significant difference (F(1,130) = 1.28, p > .26). Analysis of the between-subjects factors
explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of message belief a
significant difference (F(1,130) = 10.82, p < .002). Finally the analysis of the between-subjects
factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no), and the betweensubjects measure of message belief revealed no significant interaction (F(1,130) = .93, p > .33).
In combination, these results reveal that (i) showing participants explicit scarcity signals
additively influence participants’ belief in the scarcity signal and (ii) varying the scarcity factors
have no combined influence on participants’ belief in the scarcity signal.
A contrast between the implicit and explicit conditions showing the schematic of the
plane demonstrates a significant difference in belief in the messaging (F(1, 130) = 9.05, p <
.004). In other words, participants believe the message more when shown implicit than an
explicit scarcity signal accompanying a schematic of the plane. A similar contrast between the
implicit and explicit text conditions shows no significant difference (F(1, 130) = 2.70, p > .1).
Thus, there is no evidence participants believe the message more when shown implicit than an
explicit scarcity signal accompanying text of the seat locations. A contrast between the explicit
picture of the plane and the explicit text shows no significant difference (F(1, 130) = 2.30, p >
.1). Similarly, a contrast between the implicit schematic of the plane and the implicit text shows
no significant difference (F(1, 130) = .02, p > .8). Thus, there is no evidence suggesting a
difference between similar conditions of the text vs similar conditions of the schematic across
scarcity signals.
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Figure 14: Mean of Pressure to Purchase Across Conditions
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As shown in Figure 14, the analysis on the manipulated between-subjects factors plane
schematic (yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of pressure to purchase revealed no
significant difference (F(1,130) = 1.02, p > .31). Analysis of the between-subjects factors
explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of pressure to purchase
revealed a significant difference (F(1,130) = 19.33, p < .0001). Finally the analysis of the
between-subjects factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no),
and the between-subjects measure of pressure to purchase revealed no significant interaction
(F(1,130) = 5.46, p > .03). In combination, these results reveal that (i) showing participants
explicit scarcity signals additively influence participants’ pressure to purchase and (ii) varying
the scarcity factors have no combined influence on participants’ pressure to purchase.
A contrast between the implicit and explicit conditions showing the schematic of the
plane demonstrates no significant difference in pressure to make the purchase by the airline (F(1,
130) = 2.12, p > .1). A similar contrast between the implicit and explicit text conditions shows a
significant difference (F(1, 130) = 22.67, p < .0001). Therefore, even though there is no evidence
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to suggest people are affected by the differing scarcity signals in non-congruent ways when the
schematic is present, there is evidence to suggest they are when only shown the text. A contrast
between the explicit schematic of the plane and the explicit text shows a significant difference
(F(1, 130) = 5.38, p < .03). Conversely, a contrast between the implicit schematic of the plan and
the implicit text shows no significant difference (F(1, 130) = .97, p > .3).
The analysis of the between-subjects factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit
scarcity statement (yes vs. no), and the between-subjects measure of seat availability revealed no
significant omnibus (F(3,130) = 1.41, p > .24). Similar analysis of the between-subjects factors
plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no), and the betweensubjects measure of seat location revealed no significant omnibus (F(3,130) = 1.42, p > .24).
Lastly, analysis of the between-subjects factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity
statement (yes vs. no), and the between-subjects measure of number of seats revealed a
marginally significant omnibus (F(3,130) = 2.52, p < .07). Therefore, no evidence is present to
suggest that participants were influenced to purchase or not by the seat availability and location;
however, participants purchase was marginally influenced by the number of seats available. The
only contrast that showed significance for number of seats was that of the implicit and explicit
text conditions (F(1, 130) = 5.68, p < .02).
Discussion. Taken together, these results are convoluted at best—although, several
significant differences can be seen between conditions, the more granular contrasts of these
conditions indicate that it is not necessarily consistent with the hypotheses. Second, there is the
issue that the conditions in which the schematic is shown, gives more information than the
conditions with just the text. In the schematic, consumers are better able to understand the size of
the plane, the position of the seats, etc. Lastly, using the words “hurry up” prior to the direct
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scarcity signal can be easily interpreted as a persuasive message. Therefore, study two will aim
to rectify these issues.
Study 2: Scarcity Signals Information Consistency and No Pressure – Movie Scenario
This study is motivated to ensure that all participants see the equivalent amount of
information across conditions. Furthermore, using phrases like, “hurry up” in conjunction with
the explicit scarcity signal is a confound that diminishes the finding in the previous study. To use
this additional impetus to act is outside of the scope of the proposed theory and will certainly
further bias our results. Study 2 will take shape with these precursors in mind.
Method. Seventy-five paid participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Participants were asked to imagine they were planning to go see a movie with a friend. They
were told there are two movie premiers that they are interested in seeing. Upon visiting the
theater’s website to check for available tickets and select their seats, participants were presented
with a graphic showing Movie 1 and Movie 2 and indicating that they had similar start times and
needed reserved seating. Unlike in Study 1, participants in all conditions were shown a schematic
of the seating available in the theater for both Movie 1 and Movie 2. Movie 1 had sixty-five
available seats all over the theater while Movie 2 only had seven seats remaining. Participants
were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions—the first condition was presented with
just the graphic showing the available seats in each theater (Implicit). The second condition was
presented with a graphic, shown in Figure 15, showing the same available seats but each theater
had a statement in red that said “Only 65 Seats Left” for Movie 1 and “Only 7 Seats Left” for
Movie 2 (Explicit).
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Figure 15: Movie Graphic for Explicit Condition

Participants then indicated how likely they were to purchase a ticket on a seven-point
scale ranging from “Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely Likely 7” for both Movie 1 and Movie
2. On another page, participants were asked if they believed the messaging regarding the seats
offered by the movie theater (“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”).
Furthermore, on the same page, participants were asked to what extent their purchase decision
was influenced by the seat locations, seat availability, and number of seats in three separate
measures (“Not At All Influenced 1” – “Entirely Influenced 7”). On an additional page,
participants were asked to what extent their purchase decision was influenced by preferring more
popular movie screenings or less crowded movie screenings. Next, on a separate screen,
participants were asked to what extent they felt pressured to make the purchase by the movie
theater and the potential the movie would sell out in two separate measures (“Not At All
Pressured 1” – “Entirely Pressured 7”). On the final screen, participants were asked an attention
check question, their gender, and age prior to thanking them for their participation.
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Figure 16: Means Across Conditions Movies
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Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, two-level, between-subjects
“purchase” factor for both Movie 1 and Movie 2. As seen in Figure 16, the analysis revealed the
that the implicit and explicit scarcity signals do not significantly affect purchase likelihood for
Movie 1(Mimplicit = 5.78, Mexplicit = 5.95, F(1, 73) = .32, p > .5) or Movie 2 (Mimplicit = 2.97,
Mexplicit = 3, F(1, 73) = .00, p > .9). Similarly, a mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated,
two-level, between-subjects “believe” factor. The analysis revealed that the implicit and explicit
scarcity signals do not significantly affect belief in the messaging (Mimplicit = 5.86, Mexplicit = 5.71,
F(1, 73) = .31, p > .5). The analysis related to seat location (Mimplicit = 5.49, Mexplicit = 5.18, F(1,
73) = .65, p > .4), seat availability (Mimplicit = 5.78, Mexplicit = 5.61, F(1, 73) = .26, p > .6), and
number of seats (Mimplicit = 4.92, Mexplicit = 4.95, F(1, 73) = .00, p > .9) all indicated no significant
differences between conditions. The analysis related to preferring more popular movie
screenings indicated no significance (Mimplicit = 3.08, Mexplicit = 2.71, F(1, 73) = .72, p > .3) while
the analysis related to preferring less crowded movie screenings indicated marginal significance
(Mimplicit = 4.59, Mexplicit = 5.39, F(1, 73) = 2.9, p < .1). Finally, the analysis revealed no
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significant difference between conditions related to pressure to make a purchase by the movie
theater (Mimplicit = 2.57, Mexplicit = 2.5, F(1, 73) = .04, p > .8) and pressure that the movie would
potentially sell out (Mimplicit = 3.24, Mexplicit = 2.97, F(1, 73) = .5, p > .4).
Discussion. Although this study overcame the inconsistency in amount of information
given to each condition and the implied persuasive attempt of adding “hurry up” to the direct
scarcity signal, there was no significant difference between our conditions on all measures.
Perhaps with a larger sample size, we would see a significant difference in preferring less
crowded theaters but that does not pertain to the hypotheses at hand. Furthermore, this context is
particularly poor at getting participants involved. Thus, we will attempt to rectify these issues
with Study 3.
Study 3: Scarcity Signals Activation – Car Dealer Scenario
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine exactly why Study 2 did not produce the
theorized results; however, one potential culprit is participant’s lack of engagement. Study 3 will
attempt to further participant’s engagement in a plethora of ways. After all, if the study itself
does not engage participants enough then it will be difficult to determine if the activation theory
is at work in the implicit scarcity signaling conditions.
Method. One hundred and one paid participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Participants were asked to imagine they were in the market for a new car and to answer a
few questions about the car that interested them the most. Participants were asked what the make
and model of their new car would be and how much they would be willing to spend at most on
the new car. Then in an effort to engage with participants more, they imagined a scenario in
which they go to a car dealership to check out the car they are interested in and find the make
and model at the dealership for significantly less than the amount they were willing to pay. Their
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answers from the previous questions about the make, model, and amount are piped in to increase
engagement (further piped answers will be indicated by [Car Make] [Car Model]). Participants
were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions—the participants in the first condition
were presented with a statement that said, “While checking out the car, the salesperson points out
that it is the only [Car Make] [Car Model] on the lot” (Explicit). The participants in the second
condition were presented with a statement that said, “While checking out the car, you notice that
it is the only [Car Make] [Car Model] on the lot” (Implicit). To even further increase
participant’s engagement, they were then asked to describe the scenario briefly.
On another page, participants then indicated how likely they were to purchase the [Car
Make] [Car Model] on a seven-point scale ranging from “Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely
Likely 7”. On another page, participants were asked to what extent they believe they saw all of
the dealerships inventory and the information provided by the salesperson in two separate
measures (“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). Furthermore, on the
same page, participants were asked two questions about what extent their purchase decision was
influenced by the availability of the [Car Make] [Car Model] (“Not At All Influenced 1” –
“Entirely Influenced 7”). On a separate page, participants were asked to what extent they felt
pressured to make the purchase by the salesperson and by the dealership in two separate
measures (“Not At All Pressured 1” – “Entirely Pressured 7”). Lastly, on a separate screen,
participants were asked their gender and age prior to thanking them for their participation.
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Figure 17: Means Across Conditions Car Dealer
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Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, two-level factor (Implicit and
Explicit) and all between-subjects measures. As seen in Figure 17, the analysis revealed a
marginally significant difference on purchase likelihood (purchase) between conditions (MImplicit
= 5.10, MExplicit= 4.57, F(1, 99) = 2.99, p < .09), which indicates that participants’ purchase
likelihood was marginally significantly different depending on if the scarcity signal was explicit
or implicit. Unfortunately, the analysis reveals no significant difference between conditions in
the belief participants saw all of the dealerships inventory (allInventory) (MImplicit = 4.23,
MExplicit= 4.09, F(1, 99) = .16, p > .6) or in what the salesperson told participants (believeSales)
(MImplicit = 4.08, MExplicit= 4.51, F(1, 99) = 1.85, p > .1). Thus, indicating that the persuasion
knowledge model was most likely not triggered differently with explicit vs. implicit scarcity
signals. This is further confirmed in that analysis revealed no significant difference between
conditions in either availability measure; purchase influenced by the availability of the [Car
Make] [Car Model] (availability1) (MImplicit = 4.50, MExplicit= 4.23, F(1, 99) = .61, p > .4) and
purchase influenced by the number of available [Car Make] [Car Model] (availability 2) (MImplicit
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= 4.29, MExplicit= 3.77, F(1, 99) = .1.92, p > .1). Thus, further demonstrating that participants
were not influenced by an implicit scarcity signal more than an explicit one. However, the
analysis does reveal a significant difference between conditions in the amount of pressure to
make a purchase perceived by the participants in regards to both the sales person (pressSales)
(MImplicit = 3.10, MExplicit= 3.94, F(1, 99) = 4.92, p < .03) and the dealership (pressDealer)
(MImplicit = 3.13, MExplicit= 3.98, F(1, 99) = 5.13, p < .03). Thus, indicating that participants felt
more pressured to make a purchase when explicit scarcity signals were used.
Discussion. Although this study attempted to engage participants more than previous
studies, there is still lacking evidence that consumers believe implicit scarcity signals more than
they believe explicit signals. Although only marginally, it is interesting to see some difference
between implicit and explicit scarcity signals on purchase likelihood. Furthermore, it is apparent
that even without the implied persuasion of a “hurry up” statement, participants still felt more
pressured to make a purchase when presented with an explicit scarcity signal than when
presented with an implicit scarcity signal.
Study 4: Scarcity Signals Choice – Wine Store Scenario
In Study 4, I attempt to make persuasion overtly apparent across all conditions—
although, this should equally effect implicit and explicit scarcity conditions, this will make it
easier to see the distinction between them if our hypotheses hold. In the explicit condition, we
should see participants resist the persuasive attempt in a more exaggerated fashion than in Study
2 and 3. Furthermore, in the implicit condition, participants should be more willing to assume the
scarcity signal is authentic and act accordingly.
Method. One hundred and forty-five paid participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Participants were first asked to provide some example of ways they thought
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retailers attempt to convince them to buy products. This was designed to prime them to be aware
of persuasive tactics and should equally effect both conditions. Unfortunately, in other studies, it
is difficult to tell if participants detected a persuasive element; therefore, priming them to be
aware of persuasive attempts should help.
Figure 18: Wine Graphic

On a separate page, participants were asked to imagine they were running early on their
way to a friend’s house and decided to stop in a wine store to see if there is anything they could
share with their friend. On a separate page, participants are told that it is only them and the clerk
in the store, so they have the clerk’s undivided attention and the clerk helps discuss wine options.
The clerk and participants narrow the wine selection down to two bottles Wine A and Wine B.
Participants are shown a picture of the two identical bottles only differing in the letter label
(Figure 18). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions—the participants
in the first condition were presented with a statement that said, “You are leaning toward
purchasing Wine B. While looking at the display, the clerk points out that there are only two
bottles of Wine A remaining” (Explicit). The participants in the second condition were presented
with a statement that said, “You are leaning toward purchasing Wine B. While looking at the
display, you notice that there are only two bottles of Wine A remaining” (Implicit). Participants
were told that they were leaning toward purchasing the less scarce selection of Wine B to further
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prime and persuasive attempts to get them to switch to Wine A (both explicit and implicit).
Again, in order to make persuasive attempts as salient as possible in participants’ minds, they
have been instructed that they already favor one brand. An attempt to pull them away from that
brand should seem all the more suspicious and further trigger their resistance across conditions.
Participants were then asked to describe the scenario briefly. Furthermore, participants
were asked how likely they are to purchase Wine A or Wine B on two seven-point scales ranging
from “Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely Likely 7”. On another page, participants indicated to
what extent they believe they saw all of the wine store’s inventory and to what extent there are
less bottles of Wine A in the store than Wine B in two separate measures (“Completely DO NOT
Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). Furthermore, participants were asked to what extent their
purchase decision was influenced by the availability of Wine A and, in a separate measure, the
availability of Wine B in three separate measures (“Not At All Influenced 1” – “Entirely
Influenced 7”). On a separate page, participants were asked if they felt pressured by the clerk to
purchase Wine A and, in a separate measure, pressured by the clerk to purchase Wine B (“Not At
All Pressured 1” – “Entirely Pressured 7”). On another screen, participants were asked an
attention check question, their gender, and age prior to thanking them for their participation.
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Figure 19: Means Across Conditions Wine Store
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Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, two-level, between-subjects
factor (Implicit and Explicit). As seen in Figure 19, the analysis revealed no significant
difference on purchase likelihood for Wine A between conditions (MImplicit = 4.12, MExplicit= 3.68,
F(1, 143) = 2.16, p > .1), which indicates that participants’ purchase likelihood for Wine A (the
scarcer wine) was not different depending on if the scarcity signal was explicit or implicit.
Similarly, the analysis revealed no significant difference on purchase likelihood for Wine B
between conditions (MImplicit = 4.36, MExplicit= 4.74, F(1, 143) = 2.24, p > .1), which indicates that
participants’ purchase likelihood for Wine B was not different depending on if the scarcity signal
was explicit or implicit. Unfortunately, the analysis revealed no significant difference on the
belief participants saw all of the wine in the store’s inventory (MImplicit = 3.61, MExplicit= 3.54,
F(1, 143) = .06, p > .7) and to what extent participants believed there are less bottles of Wine A
in the store than Wine B (MImplicit = 4.87, MExplicit= 4.65, F(1, 143) = .57, p > .4). Thus, offering
no evidence that participants believed implicit scarcity signals more than explicit signals.
Although, there was no significance to purchase likelihood or believability of the scarcity
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signals, analysis revealed that there was a significant difference between being exposed to an
explicit or implicit scarcity signal in relation participants being influenced by the availability of
Wine A (MImplicit = 4.21, MExplicit= 3.35, F(1, 143) = 6.10, p < .02) and Wine B (MImplicit = 3.94,
MExplicit= 3.31, F(1, 143) = 4.17, p < .05). Thus, indicating that participants felt more influenced
by availability of the wines when they were exposed to an implicit (vs. explicit) scarcity signals.
Finally, the analysis showed significant difference in pressure to purchase Wine A between
conditions (MImplicit = 2.57, MExplicit= 3.68, F(1, 143) = 13.41, p < .0005) and no significant
difference to purchase Wine B between conditions (MImplicit = 2.16, MExplicit= 1.99, F(1, 143) =
.58, p > .4). Thus, indicating that participants were more pressured to purchase Wine A when
presented with an explicit scarcity signal and also not pressured to purchase Wine B when
presented with an explicit or implicit scarcity signal relating to Wine A.
Discussion. Although we consistently see differences in pressure in Study 3 and 4, we see
inconsistent indications for purchase likelihood across studies and no indication that belief
changes related to what scarcity signal a consumer is presented with. In this study, we did see
indication that consumers feel more influenced to purchase by implicit than explicit scarcity
signals. The information presented to each participant, regardless of condition, has remained
consistent in the Study 2, 3, and 4; however, one could argue that all conditions see the implicit
scarcity signal and the explicit scarcity signal is additional information. Thus, simply by being
given additional information, participants are somehow more influenced. This will be addressed
in Study 5.
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Study 5: Scarcity Signals Additional Information – Wine Store Scenario
If the explicit scarcity signal is simply thought of as additional information, then we
could see pressure to purchase measures rise amongst participants regardless of the scarcity
signal. This pressure to purchase could simply be interpersonal pressure have nothing to do with
the scarcity signal—in order to test this, we would need to have a condition where the firm gives
additional information that does not include an explicit scarcity signal and compare that with the
explicit scarcity signal conditions. Study 5 aims to do just that.
Method. One hundred and twenty-nine paid participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Similar to Study 4, participants were first asked to provide some example of
ways they thought retailers attempt to convince them to buy products. On a separate page,
participants were asked to imagine they were running early on their way to a friend’s house and
decided to stop in a wine store to see if there is anything they could share with their friend. On a
separate page, participants are shown the graphic in Figure 20 and told they are considering two
wines; Wine A and Wine B. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions.
The participants in the first condition were shown no further manipulations—the graphic itself
illustrates that Wine A is scarce (Implicit). The participants in the second condition were shown
the graphic in Figure 20 as well as a statement that says, “The clerk points out that there are only
two bottles of Wine A remaining” (Explicit). The participants in the third condition were shown
the graphic in Figure 20 as well as a statement that says, “The clerk recommends either wine”
(Control). The third condition represents the control in that participants are still shown further
information, yet this information does not contain a further scarcity signal.
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Figure 20: Implicit Scarcity Signal from Study 5

Participants were then asked to describe the scenario briefly. Furthermore, participants
were asked which wine are they more likely to purchase on a six-point scale that consists of,
“Definitely Wine A”, “Probably Wine A”, “Maybe Wine A”, “Maybe Wine B”, “Probably Wine
B”, and “Definitely Wine B”. On another page, participants were asked to what extent their
purchase decision was influenced by the availability of Wine A and, in a separate measure, the
availability of Wine B (“Not At All Influenced 1” – “Entirely Influenced 7”). Furthermore,
participants were asked if they felt pressured by the clerk to purchase Wine A and, in a separate
measure, pressured by the clerk to purchase Wine B (“Not At All Pressured 1” – “Entirely
Pressured 7”). On a separate page, participants were asked if they believed the wine store
controls the inventory customers see, manipulates the inventory customers see, manipulated the
inventory of Wine A to communicate scarcity, and attempting to convince you to buy Wine A by
making it seem more scarce (“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). On a
separate screen, participants were asked a manipulation check question, attention check question,
their gender, and age prior to thanking them for their participation.
Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, three-level, between-subjects
factor (Implicit, Explicit, Control). The analysis revealed no significant difference on purchase
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likelihood between conditions (MImplicit = 2.56, MExplicit= 2.54, MControl= 2.74, F(2, 126) = .51, p >
.5) which indicates that participants’ purchase likelihood for either wine was not different
depending on if the scarcity signal was implicit, explicit, or implicit with a control of more
information. Interestingly, although analysis revealed no significant difference in the extent
participants purchase decision was influenced by the availability of Wine A (MImplicit = 5.42,
MExplicit= 5.03, MControl= 5.23, F(2, 126) = .59, p > .5), analysis did reveal significant differences
in the extent participants were influenced by the availability of Wine B between conditions
(MImplicit = 4.60, MExplicit= 3.95, MControl= 5.02, F(2, 126) = 4.90, p < .01). This indicates that the
availability of Wine B influences decisions more when explicit scarcity signal is not present.
Furthermore, analysis showed that there was no significant difference between pressure to
purchase Wine A (MImplicit = 2.70, MExplicit= 3.28, MControl= 3.47, F(2, 126) = 1.78, p > .1) or
pressure to purchase Wine B between conditions (MImplicit = 2.37, MExplicit= 1.90, MControl= 2.28,
F(2, 126) = 1.11, p > .3). Thus far, pressure has demonstrated fairly robust differences between
the two types of scarcity; however, these results indicate that this difference might have been
simply from the representative, the clerk in this example, giving any additional information.
Lastly, analysis showed that all believability measures were not significantly different between
conditions; believed the wine store controls the inventory customers see (MImplicit = 5.09,
MExplicit= 5.38, MControl= 4.89, F(2, 126) = 1.18, p > .3), manipulates the inventory customers see
(MImplicit = 4.58, MExplicit= 4.71, MControl= 4.36, F(2, 126) = .54, p > .5), manipulated the inventory
of Wine A to communicate scarcity (MImplicit = 4.49, MExplicit= 4.46, MControl= 4.13, F(2, 126) =
.62, p > .5), and attempting to convince you to buy Wine A by making it seem more scarce
(MImplicit = 4.58, MExplicit= 4.36, MControl= 4.02, F(2, 126) = 1.26, p > .2).
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Discussion. Although we consistently see differences in pressure in Study 3 and 4, the
findings in Study 5 indicate that the difference in pressure felt by consumers might have more to
do with the fact that a representative is giving them more information than a particular scarcity
signal. Study 6 will move away from product scarcity and move into deal scarcity.
Study 6: Scarcity Signals Discounts – Music Store Scenario
Method. One hundred and seven paid participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Similar to Study 4 and 5, participants were first asked to provide some
example of ways they thought retailers attempt to convince them to buy products. On a separate
page, participants were asked to imagine they were shopping for a small birthday gift for their
musician friend. Upon searching the web for potential gift ideas, they find out that a harmonica is
an affordable gift idea. They go to the website of a popular woodwind instrument company and
narrow the selection down to one harmonica. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of
three conditions. The participants in the first condition were shown a graphic similar to that of
Figure 21 sans the text after “Annual Sale” (Control). This differs from the control used in Study
5 in that participant are shown no scarcity signal whatsoever here vs. being shown scarcity and
given additional information. The participants in the second condition were shown a graphic
matching Figure 21 (Explicit). The participants in the third condition were shown a graphic
similar to Figure 21 except it featured text in red after “Annual Sale” that read “Available Until
[piped text featuring a date two days after the participants completed the experiment]” (Implicit).
This implicit scarcity signal varies from ones used in previous studies—however, the goal of this
signal is congruent in that it aims to allow participants to discover the scarcity through more in
depth activation.
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Figure 21: Explicit Scarcity Signal from Study 6

Participants were then asked to describe the scenario briefly. Furthermore, participants
were asked how likely they are to purchase the harmonica on a seven-point scale ranging from
“Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely Likely 7”. Then, in an effort to move from the
inconsistent dependent measure of purchase likelihood to a measure that could be more effected
by pressure, participants were asked how satisfied they are with their shopping experience
“Extremely Unsatisfied 1” to “Extremely Satisfied 7”). On another page, participants were asked
to what extent their purchase decision was influenced by the availability of the Annual Sale
(“Not At All Influenced 1” – “Entirely Influenced 7”). Furthermore, participants were asked to
what extent they felt pressured to purchase the harmonica (“Not At All Pressured 1” – “Entirely
Pressured 7”). On a separate page, participants were asked if they believed the music store was
attempting to convince them to buy the harmonica by making the Annual Sale seem scarcer
(“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). Finally, on a separate screen,
participants were asked a manipulation check question, attention check question, their gender,
and age prior to thanking them for their participation.
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Figure 22: Means Across Conditions Music Deal
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Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, three-level, between-subjects
factors (Implicit, Explicit, Control). As shown in Figure 22, the analysis revealed marginally
significant difference on purchase likelihood for between conditions (MImplicit = 5.00, MExplicit=
5.22, MControl= 5.78, F(2, 104) = 2.77, p < .07), which indicates that participants’ purchase
likelihood was marginally different depending on if the scarcity signal was implicit, explicit, or
non-existent. However, contrary to our theory and that of other scarcity theories, it indicates that
consumers are more likely to purchase the harmonica when no scarcity signal is present.
Furthermore, contrary to our theory, these findings indicate that consumers are more likely to
purchase the harmonica when explicit scarcity is present than when implicit scarcity is present.
Unfortunately, the analysis of the newly introduced measure of satisfaction showed no
significant difference between conditions (MImplicit = 5.26, MExplicit= 5.19, MControl= 5.63, F(2,
104) = 1.01, p > .3). These results indicate that consumers are not more satisfied with a shopping
experience if scarcity signals are present or not, regardless of their explicit nature. The analysis
of the availability measure revealed that there was significant differences between conditions
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(MImplicit = 4.77, MExplicit= 5.00, MControl= 3.90, F(2, 104) = 4.75, p < .02). These findings indicate
that consumers again find themselves influenced by the availability of the deal; however, in this
case, participants are more influenced when the deal is explicitly scarce than when they have to
exert more resources to discover how scarce it is. Interestingly, the analysis revealed a significant
difference of pressure between conditions (MImplicit = 3.48, MExplicit= 4.22, MControl= 2.23, F(2,
104) = 13.71, p < .0001). These findings indicate that consumers feel less pressure when
presented with no scarcity signal. A contrast between the Control and Implicit conditions further
demonstrates this (F(1, 104) = 9.76, p < .003). A similar contrast between the Control and
Explicit conditions shows similar significant difference (F(1, 104) = 26.65, p < .0001). A
contrast between the Explicit and Implicit conditions shows a marginally significant difference
(F(1, 104) = 3.20, p < .07). Thus, giving evidence that consumers feel marginally less pressure
when implicit than when explicit scarcity signals are present. Lastly, the analysis revealed a
significant difference of belief between conditions (MImplicit = 5.58, MExplicit= 5.92, MControl= 4.35,
F(2, 104) = 11.15, p < .0001). These findings indicate that consumers believe the music store
was attempting to convince them to buy the harmonica by making the Annual Sale seem scarcer
when a scarcity signal is present. A contrast between the Control and Implicit conditions further
demonstrates this (F(1, 104) = 11.40, p < .002). A contrast between the Control and Explicit
conditions shows similar significant difference (F(1, 104) = 20.04, p < .0001). However, a
contrast between the Explicit and Implicit conditions shows no significant difference (F(1, 104)
= .81, p > .3). These findings indicate that consumers feel no difference in belief that the store is
attempting to convince them to buy the harmonica when presented with implicit than when
explicit scarcity signals.
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Discussion. Although Study 6 covered the novel context of deal scarcity, these results
indicate that the hypotheses are misguided. Further evidence of this point can be seen in the
control condition of this study demonstrating how a lack of a scarcity signal acts compared to
implicit and explicit scarcity. Ultimately, additional studies are unnecessary—the original
hypotheses do not hold. To note, throughout this empirical approach, several others studies were
conducted that too closely resemble the studies outlined here to warrant a place in this essay.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I examined the extent to which consumers’ beliefs
of scarcity signals presented by a firm difference based on the manner in which those signals are
delivered. Drawing on literature from creativity (Goldenberg, Mazursky, and Solomon 1999a,
1999b) and persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1994; Chaiken et al. 1987; Petty and Cacioppo
1986), I proposed that consumers are more likely to believe implicit (vs. explicit) scarcity
signals. Specifically, I proposed that implicit scarcity signals require the consumer to engage in
the communication and alter the perceived source and intention of the scarcity signal. Ultimately,
the hypotheses indicated that the consumer would no longer feel the source of the scarcity signal
is the firm and that the intentions are to persuade the consumer. Further, when presented with an
implicit scarcity signal, consumers are more likely to believe the signal is authentic and alter
their purchasing behavior to match previous scarcity literature. Unfortunately, the hypotheses do
not hold.
Theoretical Implications. Since the theory was grounded in prior research, it is worth
exploring why the hypotheses did not hold. Foremost, it should be examined whether that the
types of manipulation and strengths of manipulation used in the studies are substandard;
however, given the amount of studies run and the varying manipulations, this seems less likely
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than other alternatives. Secondly, the hypotheses not holding could be related to the measures
being substandard. This is entirely plausible—the measures could have been miscalibrated or
insensitive to shifts in the underlying constructs. It is possible the measures did not accurately
communicate the way participants were feeling. Ultimately, the reasons these hypotheses did not
hold were most likely related to it not being an accurate representation of how consumers
behave. It would seem that people do not perceive implicit and explicit scarcity signals as being
different—at least not consistently so. Although a large portion of the theory is based on extant
research related to how consumers treat persuasive attempts and scarcity signals, the theory is
also based on the activation template (1999a, 1999b). As stated in the theory introduction, there
is little empirical evidence that messages or products crafted with this template are more
persuasive or, critically, more believable. Perhaps perceived effort on the part of the consumer is
not substantial enough for them to attribute the scarcity discovery to themselves. Furthermore,
perhaps this effort on the part of the consumer does not offset the source knowledge—i.e.
consumers ultimately know the information comes from the firm.
Managerial Implications. Although it is difficult to elaborate on null hypotheses, it stands
to reason that some of the lack of findings in this essay could be useful to managers. Given that
purchase likelihood was mostly insignificantly affected by the presence of an explicit (vs.
implicit) scarcity signal, it would make sense for managers to employ implicit scarcity signals
when optional. In doing so, managers could avoid much of the perceived pressure exerted by the
firm on their customers. Although not captured in the studies associated with this paper, perhaps
this pressure would negatively affect customer relationships, either overtime or per individual
visit. As the explicit vs. implicit scarcity signals did not make a demonstrable difference in
likelihood of sale, it would seem worthwhile to reduce the potential for conflict or pressure.
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Future Direction. Consumers encounter scarcity regularly—unfortunately, from the
consumer perspective it is almost impossible to confirm if this scarcity is driven by market forces
or if the scarcity of a product or service is being manipulated to affect the persuasiveness of a
marketer’s message. Based on the lack of findings accompanying the research, it appears that
consumers, even primed to be cognizant of scarcity manipulations, do not treat explicit scarcity
any different than implicit scarcity in regards to the authenticity of the scarcity. In a “real world”
setting, this comparison might still hold—in addition, many other factors may pollute such
observations. Therefore, one might argue that these findings would be different in the
dramatically more intricate setting of everyday life. Therefore, it would be interesting to try a
similar manipulation to some of the studies in a field experiment.
When conducting future research about deal scarcity, it is important to note that a deal,
by nature, is scarce. Therefore, one might argue that the control condition in Study 6 is really the
most implicit scarcity signal. Ultimately, participants in this condition needed to recognize the
deal was scarce through their own efforts—not through any mechanism explicitly telling them. If
this is considered the case, the findings of this study are the most robust in favor of the
hypothesis throughout the entire paper. Future studies would need to be conducted to determine
if participants actually perceived the deal as scarce.
Beyond that, if the lack of findings in the third chapter of this dissertation are any
indication, it appears that belief is not a factor that needs to be considered when discussing
scarcity signals. However, perhaps this research could be drawn on to develop a deeper
understanding of pressure. More specifically, if increased pressure could lead to less
satisfaction—either with the purchase or the purchase environment. Ultimately, this pressure
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could influence a customer’s willingness to return to a store or purchase products from an
organization.
Another novel question that stemmed from this research is: are people less skeptical of
persuasive attempts in digital vs. interpersonal interactions? One could argue that there are more
cues to go off of in interpersonal communication—since it is much easier to perfectly craft a
message in a digital context than an interpersonal one. Beyond that, this idea rides a fine line of
being too obvious and being surprising if people are actually less skeptical and potentially more
susceptible to persuasive attempts in digital compared to interpersonal contexts. It appears, based
on the findings, that people feel more pressure from interpersonal than digital communications.
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CHAPTER 4:
Summary and Closing Thoughts
In this dissertation, I argued that belief, more specifically consumers’ belief in claims or
material generated by the firm, should be more adequately examined in contemporary consumer
behavior literature. To this end, I reviewed current theories that attempt to understand belief in
consumer behavior literature. Furthermore, I explored two empirical examinations of how certain
factors influence consumers’ belief in firm-generated communication and how differing levels of
belief affect consumer behavior. My goal was to better understand the relationship between
belief and consumer behavior, and, in particular, how belief can be managed more appropriately
from both a managerial and a consumer standpoint.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I examined the extent to which consumers’
beliefs of the claims made by a point of contact (POC) evolve over repeated service failures. I
draw on literature from deception detection (Ekman and Friesen 1969; Ekman 2009) and
coincidence (Dessalles 2006; Dessalles 2008; Dimulescu and Dessalles 2009) to propose that
consumers are more likely to believe a POC when the POC gives different (vs. the same) reasons
for each of the service failures. Specifically, I established that ostensible coincidences (the same
reason given repeatedly for service failures) provided by the POC lead consumers to discount
these explanations for the service failures. Consumers find ostensible coincidences less
believable although these coincidences suggest a systemic cause for the service failure that is
both more likely and more expected by the consumer a priori. Further, when presented with an
ostensible coincidence, consumers are more likely to blame the POC for the service failure.
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In the third chapter of this dissertation, I conducted research in an attempt to outline the
extent to which consumers’ beliefs of scarcity signals presented by a firm differ based on the
manner in which those signals are delivered. Drawing on literature from creativity (Goldenberg,
Mazursky, and Solomon 1999a, 1999b) and persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1994; Chaiken et al.
1987; Petty and Cacioppo 1986), I theorized that consumers are more likely to believe implicit
(vs. explicit) scarcity signals. Specifically, implicit scarcity signals require the consumer to
engage in the communication and alter the perceived source and intention of the scarcity signal.
The consumer will no longer feel the source of the scarcity signal is the firm and that the
intentions are to persuade the consumer. Further, when presented with an implicit scarcity signal,
consumers should be more likely believe the signal is authentic and alter their purchasing
behavior to match previous scarcity literature. Unfortunately, my research yielded mostly null
results.
Further, I initially hypothesized that believability played an active role in consumer
interactions. I aimed to help shape the understanding of the role of believability in consumer
communications through an examination of both communication around ostensible coincidences
in service failures and in the explicit and implicit communication of scarcity. Given that my
results across these two aspects of believability achieved differing results, it would appear that
this broader topic deserves further exploration and that belief should not be assumed or ignored
as a factor in other evaluations of consumer behavior.

81

Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation
Works Cited:
Anolli, Luigi, and Rita Ciceri. 1997. 'The voice of deception: Vocal strategies of naive and able liars',
Journal of nonverbal behavior, 21: 259-84.
Blodgett, Jeffrey G, Kirk L Wakefield, and James H Barnes. 1995. 'The effects of customer service on
consumer complaining behavior', Journal of Services Marketing, 9: 31-42.
Bok, Sissela. 2011. Lying: Moral choice in public and private life (Vintage).
Burgoon, Judee K, JP Blair, Tiantian Qin, and Jay F Nunamaker Jr. 2003. 'Detecting deception through
linguistic analysis.' in, Intelligence and Security Informatics (Springer).
Campbell, John Y, and John H Cochrane. 1999. 'By force of habit: A consumption-based explanation of
aggregate stock market behavior', Journal of political Economy, 107: 205-51.
Chaiken, Shelly, Mark P Zanna, James M Olson, and C Peter Herman. 1987. "The heuristic model of
persuasion." In Social influence: the ontario symposium, 3-39. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Chaudhuri, Arjun, and Morris B Holbrook. 2001. 'The chain of effects from brand trust and brand affect
to brand performance: the role of brand loyalty', Journal of marketing, 65: 81-93.
Cialdini, Robert. 1993. 'The psychology of influence', New York: William Morrow & Co.
Cialdini, Robert B, and Nathalie Garde. 1987. Influence (A. Michel).
DePaulo, Bella M, and Deborah A Kashy. 1998. 'Everyday lies in close and casual relationships', Journal of
personality and social psychology, 74: 63.
DePaulo, Bella M, Carol Steele LeMay, and Jennifer A Epstein. 1991. 'Effects of importance of success
and expectations for success on effectiveness at deceiving', Personality and social psychology
bulletin, 17: 14-24.
DePaulo, Bella M, James J Lindsay, Brian E Malone, Laura Muhlenbruck, Kelly Charlton, and Harris
Cooper. 2003. 'Cues to deception', Psychological bulletin, 129: 74.
Dessalles, Jean-Louis. 2006. "A structural model of intuitive probability." In International Conference on
Cognitive Modeling.
Dessalles, Jean-Louis J-L. 2008. "Coincidences and the encounter problem: A formal account." In
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
Dimulescu, Adrian, and Jean-Louis Dessalles. 2009. "Understanding narrative interest: Some evidence on
the role of unexpectedness." In Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 1734-39.
Ekman, Paul. 2003. 'Darwin, deception, and facial expression', Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1000: 205-21.
———. 2009. Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage (Revised Edition)
(WW Norton & Company).
Ekman, Paul, and Wallace V Friesen. 1969. 'The repertoire of nonverbal behavior: Categories, origins,
usage, and coding', Semiotica, 1: 49-98.
Erdem, Tülin, and Joffre Swait. 2004. 'Brand credibility, brand consideration, and choice', Journal of
consumer research, 31: 191-98.
Fein, Steven. 1996. 'Effects of suspicion on attributional thinking and the correspondence bias', Journal
of personality and social psychology, 70: 1164-84.
Fein, Steven, and James L Hilton. 1994. 'Judging others in the shadow of suspicion', Motivation and
Emotion, 18: 167-98.
Fein, Steven, James L Hilton, and Dale T Miller. 1990. 'Suspicion of ulterior motivation and the
correspondence bias', Journal of personality and social psychology, 58: 753.
Feldman, Jack M, and John G Lynch. 1988. 'Self-generated validity and other effects of measurement on
belief, attitude, intention, and behavior', Journal of applied Psychology, 73: 421.

Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior
Folkes, Valerie S. 1984. 'Consumer reactions to product failure: An attributional approach', Journal of
consumer research, 10: 398-409.
Friestad, Marian, and Peter Wright. 1994. 'The persuasion knowledge model: How people cope with
persuasion attempts', Journal of consumer research, 21: 1-31.
———. 1995. 'Persuasion knowledge: Lay people's and researchers' beliefs about the psychology of
advertising', Journal of consumer research, 22: 62-74.
Gefen, David, Elena Karahanna, and Detmar W Straub. 2003. 'Trust and TAM in online shopping: an
integrated model', MIS quarterly, 27: 51-90.
Goldenberg, Jacob, David Mazursky, and Sorin Solomon. 1999a. 'The fundamental templates of quality
ads', Marketing Science, 18: 333-51.
———. 1999b. 'Toward identifying the inventive templates of new products: A channeled ideation
approach', Journal of marketing research: 200-10.
Hallowell, Roger. 1996. 'The relationships of customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, and profitability: an
empirical study', International journal of service industry management, 7: 27-42.
Herbst, Kenneth C, Eli J Finkel, David Allan, and Gráinne M Fitzsimons. 2011. 'On the dangers of pulling a
fast one: Advertisement disclaimer speed, brand trust, and purchase intention', Journal of
consumer research, 38: 909-19.
Hoyer, Wayne D. 1984. 'An examination of consumer decision making for a common repeat purchase
product', Journal of consumer research, 11: 822-29.
Ickes, William, Susan Reidhead, and Miles Patterson. 1986. 'Machiavellianism and self-monitoring: As
different as “me” and “you”', Social Cognition, 4: 58-74.
Jacoby, Jacob, and Robert W Chestnut. 1978. 'Brand loyalty: Measurement and management'.
Kain, Erik. 2017. "Nintendo's 'Limited' Switch Pre-Order Gimmick Is Just Plain Silly." In Forbes. Forbes
Website: Forbes.
Kaplan, Andreas M, and Michael Haenlein. 2010. 'Users of the world, unite! The challenges and
opportunities of Social Media', Business Horizons, 53: 59-68.
Kietzmann, Jan H, Kristopher Hermkens, Ian P McCarthy, and Bruno S Silvestre. 2011. 'Social media? Get
serious! Understanding the functional building blocks of social media', Business Horizons, 54:
241-51.
Kivetz, Ran, and Itamar Simonson. 2002. 'Self-control for the righteous: Toward a theory of
precommitment to indulgence', Journal of consumer research, 29: 199-217.
Kleinke, Chris L. 1986. 'Gaze and eye contact: a research review', Psychological bulletin, 100: 78.
Levine, Timothy R, Steven A McCornack, and Penny Baldwin Avery. 1992. 'Sex differences in emotional
reactions to discovered deception', Communication Quarterly, 40: 289-96.
Main, Kelley J, Darren W Dahl, and Peter R Darke. 2007. 'Deliberative and automatic bases of suspicion:
Empirical evidence of the sinister attribution error', Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17: 59-69.
Maxham III, James G, and Richard G Netemeyer. 2002. 'A longitudinal study of complaining customers’
evaluations of multiple service failures and recovery efforts', Journal of marketing, 66: 57-71.
McCornack, Steven A, and Timothy R Levine. 1990. 'When lies are uncovered: Emotional and relational
outcomes of discovered deception', Communications Monographs, 57: 119-38.
Mehrabian, Albert. 1977. Nonverbal communication (Transaction Publishers).
Merriam-Webster. 2017. "belief." In Merriam-Webster.
Mitchell, Andrew A. 1979. 'Involvement: a potentially important mediator of consumer behavior', NAAdvances in Consumer Research Volume 06.
Mitchell, Andrew A, and Jerry C Olson. 2000. 'Are product attribute beliefs the only mediator of
advertising effects on brand attitude?', Advertising & Society Review, 1.

83

Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation
Newman, Matthew L, James W Pennebaker, Diane S Berry, and Jane M Richards. 2003. 'Lying words:
Predicting deception from linguistic styles', Personality and social psychology bulletin, 29: 66575.
""Only One Left!"—the Latest Online Marketing Ploy." In. 2014. The Krazy Coupon Lady: The Krazy
Coupon Lady.
Ouellette, Judith A, and Wendy Wood. 1998. 'Habit and intention in everyday life: The multiple
processes by which past behavior predicts future behavior', Psychological bulletin, 124: 54.
Petty, Richard E, and John T Cacioppo. 1986. 'The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion', Advances
in experimental social psychology, 19: 123-205.
Pham, Michel Tuan, Caroline Goukens, Donald R Lehmann, and Jennifer Ames Stuart. 2010. 'Shaping
customer satisfaction through self-awareness cues', Journal of marketing research, 47: 920-32.
Ratneshwar, Srinivasan, and Shelly Chaiken. 1991. 'Comprehension's role in persuasion: The case of its
moderating effect on the persuasive impact of source cues', Journal of consumer research, 18:
52-62.
Smith, Amy K, Ruth N Bolton, and Janet Wagner. 1999. 'A model of customer satisfaction with service
encounters involving failure and recovery', Journal of marketing research: 356-72.
Trovillo, Paul V. 1939. 'A history of lie detection', Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1931-1951):
848-81.
Tsiros, Michael, Vikas Mittal, and William T Ross. 2004. 'The role of attributions in customer satisfaction:
A reexamination', Journal of consumer research, 31: 476-83.
Umashankar, Nita, Raji Srinivasan, and Jeffrey R Parker. 2016. 'Cross-Buying After Product Failure
Recovery? Depends on How You Feel About It', Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 24: 122.
Van Herpen, Erica, Rik Pieters, and Marcel Zeelenberg. 2009. 'When demand accelerates demand:
Trailing the bandwagon', Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19: 302-12.
Verhallen, Theo MM, and Henry SJ Robben. 1994. 'Scarcity and preference: An experiment on
unavailability and product evaluation', Journal of economic psychology, 15: 315-31.
Winer, Russell S. 2001. 'A framework for customer relationship management', California management
review, 43: 89-105.
Worchel, Stephen, Jerry Lee, and Akanbi Adewole. 1975. 'Effects of supply and demand on ratings of
object value', Journal of personality and social psychology, 32: 906.
Zhou, Lina, Judee K Burgoon, Jay F Nunamaker, and Doug Twitchell. 2004. 'Automating linguistics-based
cues for detecting deception in text-based asynchronous computer-mediated communications',
Group decision and negotiation, 13: 81-106.
Zhu, Meng, and Rebecca K Ratner. 2015. 'Scarcity polarizes preferences: The impact on choice among
multiple items in a product class', Journal of marketing research, 52: 13-26.
Zuckerman, Miron, Bella M DePaulo, and Robert Rosenthal. 1981. 'Verbal and nonverbal communication
of deception', Advances in experimental social psychology, 14: 59.

